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Abstract
This Article examines the use of primary jurisdiction
through the lens of institutional economics and the ongoing
revolution in pre-suit, plaintiff-side testing in mass litigation. In
this setting, primary jurisdiction serves a necessary pro-agency
institutional role. The ability of plaintiffs’ attorneys to easily
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generate sophisticated laboratory testing results has allowed
them to create a quasi-regulatory quality-control regime for
defendants’ products and extract value from it through enhanced
settlements. This offers defendants the burdens of regulation
without the benefits of uniformity or policymakers with subjectmatter expertise and capacity for public input. Primary
jurisdiction enables defendants in mass litigation to move these
quasi-regulatory actions back to regulatory settings, where the
potential for efficient quality-control standards increases with
agency expertise. Shifting decision-making in testing-based
actions to agencies then preserves this value from conversion into
litigation-based transaction costs. As scientific resolving power
and the scope of potentially measurable harm evolve, primary
jurisdiction thus functions as a central balancing mechanism
allowing corresponding evolution in adjudication.
I. Introduction
“Something there is that doesn’t love a wall . . . ...”
~ Robert Frost2
A substantial literature in economics examines the
tradeoffs of regulation versus litigation.
This literature
considers, e.g., the rise of the regulatory state,3 differences in the
regulatory state across countries,4 the role of subversion,5
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3 E.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Andrie Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory
State, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 401, 401–02 (2003) (discussing regulation and litigation
as alternatives to securing property rights and concluding the choice between
the two depends on controlling subversion of institutions); Sam Peltzman,
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211, 221–22
(1976) (proposing a general economic theory of regulation, including, e.g., the
role of imperfect information and political affiliation of interest groups).
4 E.g., Andrei Shleifer, Understanding Regulation, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT.
439, 440–42 (2005) (examining central arguments against the regulatory state,
such as litigation solving problems in imperfect markets and the possibility of
capture of regulatory officials).
5 E.g., Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 3, at 401; Jean-Jacques Laffont &
Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of
Regulatory Capture, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1089, 1089 (1991) (developing an economic
theory of regulatory capture and finding, e.g., that the greater the
informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the regulator,
the greater the possibility of capture).
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capture,6 trust versus corruption,7 and so forth.8 For ease of
analysis, the models in this literature assume a “wall” between
courts and the regulatory state and say little about how these
interface in practice. Primary jurisdiction, a central doctrine
used by courts seeking agency input or action, is unnoticed.9 At
the same time, a large legal literature examining primary
jurisdiction exists, yet this literature is sparse on the economic
structure or justifications of the doctrine.10 This Article offers a
bridge between these two literatures by examining primary
jurisdiction in an area where economic thought is particularly
Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 3, at 408.
PHILIPPE AGHION, ET AL., Regulation and Distrust, 125 Q. J. ECON. 1015,
1016 (2010) (finding that government regulation is correlated with trust across
countries).
8
See generally W. Kɪᴘ Vɪꜱᴄᴜꜱɪ, Overview, in REGULATION THROUGH
LITIGATION 2 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (noting regulation is superior to
litigation in highly technical areas or where litigation concerns an entire
product line); ANDREI SHLEIFER, Efficient Regulation, in REGULATION VS.
LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS & LAW 27, 29 (Daniel P. Kessler
ed., 2010) (finding the “case against regulation relies on well-functioning
courts . . . Insofar as courts resolve disputes cheaply, predictably, and
impartially, the efficiency case for regulation is difficult to make . . . .But when
litigation is expensive, unpredictable, or biased, the efficiency case for
regulation opens up” and that “[i]n short, the case for efficient regulation rests
on the failures of courts.”).
9
The type of modeling used to examine regulation in the economics
literature makes simplifying assumptions about the world, one of which is that
regulation and litigation are two separate approaches to problem solving,
without considering the real-world nuance of litigation that invokes regulation,
regulation that alters in response to litigation, and so on. See generally infra
note 15 (discussing additional ways in which courts and agencies interact in
practice).
10 These articles generally reference economic concepts such as efficiency
but only at a very high level, relying on other arguments to attack or defend
the doctrine. See, e.g., Diana R. H. Winters, Restoring the Primary Jurisdiction
Doctrine, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 541, 544 (2017) (arguing that primary jurisdiction
should be limited to its original context of rate-setting); Abby Cunningham,
Comment,
Purpose, Prudence, and Path: Reevaluating the Primary
Jurisdiction Doctrine in Context of Opioid Litigation, 9 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
ONLINE J. 1, 21 (2017) (noting arguments to limit primary jurisdiction to
expertise issues but arguing “such a course of action overlooks the important
goals of uniformity and promotion of a working relationship between court and
agency”); Diana R. H. Winters, Inappropriate Referral: The Use of Primary
Jurisdiction in Food-Labeling Litigation, 41 AM. J. L. & MED. 240, 255–56
(2015) (arguing that primary jurisdiction referrals may be dangerous to “the
quality and safety of the food supply” may “interfere[] with agency resource
allocation” and “diminish[] the benefits of having these cases decided in the
larger context of consumer protection law by courts well-equipped to handle
such matters.”).
6
7
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instructive: mass actions built off product testing or other presuit statistical evidence.11 Specifically, we show that in an
institutional framework, primary jurisdiction represents a
needed response to increased resolving power in pre-suit
investigation. Easy access to sophisticated product testing has
allowed plaintiffs’ attorneys to adopt the role of quasi-regulators,
using litigation and independent testing to compel quality
control standards traditionally under the auspice of agency
rulemaking and enforcement actions. This quasi-regulatory
regime enhances settlement values for plaintiffs’ attorneys,
essentially allowing the lack of agency-based regulation to act as
a legal subsidy to the bar.12
Primary jurisdiction is perhaps the central legal doctrine
allowing defendants to move quasi-regulatory actions back to a
regulatory space.13 It has been criticized as causing undue
delay, being amorphous in application, and as properly reserved

11 The mass litigation setting offers plaintiffs and defendants uniquely
asymmetrical transaction costs and incentives, lending itself particularly well
to economic insight. See, e.g., Jeff Lingwall, Isaac Ison & Chris Wray, The
Imitation Game: Structural Asymmetry in Multidistrict Litigation, 87 MISS.
L.J. 131, 166 (2018) (discussing application of the Coase Theorem to
asymmetric information and incentives in multidistrict litigation). This
Article considers two strands of economic thought, transaction cost economics,
which attempts to analyze the frictions inherent in exchange and disputes for
insights into welfare-enhancing actions, and institutional economics, which
looks at societal structures from an economic perspective. See also Steven G.
Medema, The Coase Theorem at Sixty, J. ECON. LIT (forthcoming) (discussing
transaction cost economics); DOUGLAS W. ALLEN, THE INSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION (2012) (discussing institutional economics in general).
12 See Pierre Schlag, Coase Minus the Coase Theorem – Some Problems
with Chicago Transaction Cost Analysis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 175, 221 (2013) (“[I]t
would be salutary . . . if whenever there was an inclination to tailor legal
entitlements to economize on transaction costs, we viewed it as a kind of legal
subsidy to particular users and uses and ask: Why are we engaged in this
subsidization?”). Schlag proposes generally a change in vocabulary from
“economizing on transaction costs” to “subsidization.” Id. (internal citation
omitted).
13 Courts may require the agency to have expressed prior interest in the
matter. See Astiano v. Hain Celestial Grp., 783 F.3d 753, 761 (2015) (“Common
sense tells us that even when agency expertise would be helpful, a court should
not invoke primary jurisdiction when the agency is aware of but has expressed
no interest in the subject matter of the litigation.”); Viggiano v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. CV 14-7250-DMG (MRWx), 2016 WL 5110500, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
June 21, 2016) (“[I]t is inappropriate to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine
when an agency is aware of but has expressed no interest in the matter at
hand.”).
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for only special cases involving rate setting. 14 Our argument is
generally to the contrary. In the context of testing-based mass
litigation, primary jurisdiction extends and preserves a long
history of legal and institutional change in response to
developments in the hard sciences.15 It serves as a proregulatory balancing mechanism allowing defendants to move
litigation-based quality control regimes to policymakers who
have expertise, capacity for public input, and ability to create
uniform national standards.
Consider how increased resolving power has created the
following common scenario in recent mass litigation. 16 Often, a
See Winters, supra note 10, at 544.
Primary jurisdiction is, of course, not the only method by which courts
and agencies interface. For example, another way courts and agencies
interface is through repeated, or serial, litigation. See Emily Hammond
Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1722, 1723–24 (2011) (discussing dialogue between courts and agencies
through serial litigation, in which the findings of court and agencies interplay
over years of repeated litigation and agency action). This situation provides
another opportunity for dialogue that applies in the special circumstances of
litigation that repeatedly returns to courts after agency action. A further
option for dialogue between agencies and courts is when agency action changes
in response to court interpretation. See In re J-H-J-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 563, 564
(BIA 2015) (“Given the overwhelming circuit court authority in disagreement
with [a prior case] . . . on the basis of the plain language of the statute, we will
now accede to the clear majority view of these nine circuits.”). This second type
of dialogue again depends on the special case of repeated appellate-level
disagreement with prior regulatory decisions. Finally, the “ordinary remand
rule” allows courts to remand an issue to an agency. See Christopher J.
Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency
Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1555–57 (2014) (discussing agency
remand in the immigration context). In contrast to these methods, primary
jurisdiction allows courts to allow parties to seek agency action without
repeated litigation over the same issue, appellate disagreement, or prior
contrary agency action being reviewed by courts. It thus represents a crucial
starting point for dialogue between courts and agencies.
16 See Jeff Lingwall, Food Forensics in Class Actions: The Race Between
Pleading Standards and Technology, 52 TULSA L. REV. 213, 218-23 (2017)
(describing and categorizing product testing litigation in the food labeling
context). Although multiple techniques exist to find adulteration in food, this
is not to say that policing food adulteration has become a uniformly easy task.
Particularly in a globalized world, this remains a significant challenge. See
Mahnaz Esteki, Jorge Regueiro & Jesus Simal-Gandara, Tackling Fraudsters
with Global Strategies to Expose Fraud in the Food Chain, 18 COMPREHENSIVE
REV. IN FOOD SCI. & FOOD SAFETY 425, 427 (2019) (listing multiple modern
sources of food fraud). At the same time, technological advances are quickly
progressing this science. See, e.g., Tomasz Majchrzak, Wojciech Wojnowski &
Justyna Płotka-Wasylka, Classification of Polish Wines by Application of
Ultra-Fast Gas Chromatography, 244 EUR. FOOD RES. & TECH. 1463 (2018)
14
15
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plaintiff will purchase a consumer item, presumably under the
direction of an attorney with a litigation theory on hand, have it
tested by a laboratory using sophisticated sensing equipment,
and find the trace presence of an unlabeled substance, such as a
pesticide. The level is not one illegal under the current
regulatory scheme, but is one that potentially contradicts other
claims on the label, claims which many other potential
defendants have also made. The court then faces the task of
adjudicating the claim, such as deciding whether a reasonable
person would consider this a harm based on the pleadings,
whether the court has the expertise to adjudicate based on the
technicalities of statistical product testing output, what
constitutes reasonable industry quality control practices, and
how the court’s decision relates to those made by numerous other
courts considering similar issues.17
In this situation, multiple adjudicators within and between
states face an identical problem: what level of contamination of
the pesticide, if any, should reasonably be considered in violation
of label claims? These adjudicators must answer this question
while transaction costs and the structure of typical litigation
make coordinating between cases in the short to medium term
impossible.18 For example, coordinating between state-level
adjudicators handling similar claims is difficult, even if some
particular classes of claims are assembled pre-trial in MDL
form. States have widely varying consumer protection laws,
varying standards for common law claims, and different
procedural rules for handling the reasonableness of pre-suit
investigation.19 Judges facing these types of claims have
(using machine learning techniques to classify wine origins); Kristian Pastor,
Marijana Ačanski & Djura Vujić, Gas Chromatography in Food Authentication,
in GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY - DERIVATIZATION, SAMPLE PREPARATION, APPLICATION
(Peter Kusch ed., 2019) (describing, e.g., chromatographic techniques for food
authentication, including statistical methodology).
17 See Lingwall, supra note 16, at 227–39 (discussing approaches courts
might consider when responding to product testing litigation).
18
In the long-term, it is possible that courts could build a body of
consistent precedent amounting to de-facto national standards. For food
labeling claims at least, this appears difficult due to fundamental
disagreement between courts on foundational issues such as the scope of
federal preemption.
19
See Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer
Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 175 (2011) (noting
differences among state consumer protection laws); Kenneth J. Meier, The
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historically come to widely varying conclusions, 20 which means
either the regulatory scheme becomes a confusing patchwork of
standards or the most extreme adjudicator sets a de facto
national standard without input from stakeholders other than
the parties before their particular court.21
Primary jurisdiction offers a potentially attractive
alternative in this situation. When referred to an agency, the
possibility of collective national action is invoked, avoiding
patchwork or “race to the bottom” judicial standards for
satisfying label claims.22 Agency decision making is designed to
take the views of multiple stakeholders into consideration,
whether through lobbying or participation in notice-andcomment rulemaking.23 Although the rulemaking process may
Political Economy of Consumer Protection: An Examination of State
Legislation, 40 POL. RES. Q. 343, 343 (1987) (examining state-by-state variation
in consumer protection laws from a political science perspective).
20 See Lingwall, supra note 16, at 227 (discussing responses by various
courts to product-testing based pleadings).
21 Producers facing varying state requirements yet wishing to market
products nationally must comply with the strictest state standard in order to
comply with them all. If three state-level adjudicators set standards of 0.3, 0.2,
and 0.1 parts per million for the level of contamination of a substance that
violates a label claim, then producers must enhance quality control standards
to comply with the 0.1 parts per million standard to avoid liability in each
location. This is similar to the classic “race to the bottom” problem in statelevel policymaking, except that each judge faced with a regulatory question
becomes a new potential policymaker. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State
Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?,
48 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 280-83 (1997) (describing history of the phrase “race to
the bottom” in policymaking).
22 Cf. Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will
Fal: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 57880 (1998) (discussing “race to the bottom” problems in enacting uniform state
legislation).
23 See Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of EMail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1343–46 (2011) (summarizing literature on
the pro-democratic aspects of notice-and-comment rulemaking while offering
concerns, such as agency discounting of value-laden comments); Cynthia R.
Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 402 (2011):
In announcing the final rule, agencies must demonstrate that
they have actually reviewed the public comments by
responding to criticisms, discussing alternatives, and
otherwise acknowledging relevant and substantial
comments. And federal courts have clearly demonstrated
their willingness to enforce these obligations. As a result, in
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be dominated by a limited number of large stakeholders, it
allows those stakeholders to participate in a public process in
ways which are difficult in litigation.24 Multiple consumer
groups (potential plaintiffs) and producers (potential
defendants) can offer input, allowing agency expertise to
consider these views in creating standards for label claims.25
While this is perhaps an idealized version of the regulatory
process, the process is designed, and has the capacity, to allow
input from multiple stakeholders. 26 Other than the possibility
of amicus briefs, litigation generally allows the input of the
parties alone, unless producer-defendants coordinate litigation
strategies.27 In this way, referral to an agency allows many
potential plaintiffs and defendants to contribute when creating
national standards, something the structure of litigation and its
inherent transaction costs otherwise prohibit.28
terms of its formal legal structure, rulemaking is probably
the most transparent and participatory decision-making
process used in any branch of the federal government.
24 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 23, at 402 n.30; Cary Coglianese, Citizen
Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 951
(2006) (noting empirical findings on domination of the rule-making process by
industry, including the number and sophistication of comments). In litigation, the
use of amicus briefs offers the same opportunity for multiple parties to weigh in
on a dispute, but heavy use of amicus briefs is typically limited to jurisdiction of
appellate courts.
25
See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., THE DECLARATION OF ADDED
SUGARS ON HONEY, MAPLE SYRUP, & CERTAIN CRANBERRY PRODUCTS:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: DRAFT GUIDANCE (2018) (noting FDA has “heard
concerns regarding the declaration of added sugars” and that it “received
comments from . . . industry” about a variety of related aspects of the rule).
26 See Tran v. Sioux Honey Ass’n Coop., No. 8:17-cv-00110-JLS-SS, 2017
WL 5587276, at *1, *3 (C.D. Calif. Oct. 11, 2017) (noting that “[n]ot only does
the FDA have experience defining such terms for food labeling . . . but it has the
capacity to gather facts and comments from the wider public to help define the
term.”).
27
See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Lobbyists Before the U.S. Supreme Court:
Investigating the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 60 POL. RES. Q. 55, 65 (2007)
(finding that amicus briefing empirically results in shaping the Supreme Court’s
policy output).
28 Then, just as settlements may help provide clarity to future litigants and
deter bad behavior, so does regulatory guidance. “[W]ithout the involvement of
an expert government agency in the course of litigation, the risk of erroneous
decisions in private actions may increase, as courts must decide difficult issues

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/3
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As part of its capacity to generate multi-party input,
primary jurisdiction acts as a regulatory counterweight to the
imposition of plaintiff-created quality control standards based
on analytical results.29 Imposing quality control standards on
minute food adulteration or contamination has traditionally
occurred through a regulatory enforcement process, not through
ad hoc litigation.30 This regulatory process was the result of the
input of multiple interest and political groups, and imposed
quality control standards as the outcome of a non-litigation
process. The reordering of analytical quality control to plaintiffs’
use of independent laboratory testing and resulting litigation
represents an enormous institutional shift, particularly as
plaintiffs’ attorneys are able to yield testing results together
with the threat of class action litigation to drive up settlement
values and capture the value of this quasi-regulatory regime in
the form of higher attorneys’ fees. For these reasons, primary
jurisdiction for small claims in mass actions, and testing-based
claims in particular, gives efficiency-enhancing institutional
flexibility in the face of increased measurement power by
plaintiffs in pre-suit investigation.

without the benefit of an administrative record or the agency’s expert opinion.”
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement, The Case For
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 116 (2007)
(citing Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope of Private
Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R.
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1293
(1982)).
29 In our analysis, the analytical quality-control aspect of these cases sets
them apart from other garden-variety label claims over which primary jurisdiction
may be less appropriate. See Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d
1028, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding in labeling case that “this is not a technical
area in which the FDA has greater technical expertise than the courts—every day
courts decide whether conduct is misleading.”).
30 Of course, for larger adulteration that consumers are likely to notice, the
civil court system provides a variety of frequently used remedies, such as the
implied warranty of merchantability and so on. See Jean Braucher, An Informal
Resolution Model of Consumer Product Warranty Law, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 1405,
1449-1450 (1985) (discussing consumer perception of potential warranty claims).
Smaller potential harms, perhaps undiscoverable to the ordinary consumer, have
traditionally been the realm of regulation. See, e.g., infra Section IV(D)
(discussing this history in the context of food regulation).

9

94

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 40.2

A final aim of this Article is to place this use of primary
jurisdiction in the long context of social responses to changes in
the sciences.
Institutions, whether social structures,
adjudicatory bodies, or legal doctrines, have historically evolved
in response to technological change.31 In particular, institutions
evolve as societal ability to measure increases, such as how the
ability to measure an individual’s DNA has changed criminal
law.32 By providing a path for dialogue between courts and
regulators at early stages of testing-based litigation, primary
jurisdiction allows interplay and evolution in adjudication in
response to technological change in measurement power. As
scientific resolving power pushes the limits of measurement
forward, allowing creation of extractive, private, quality-control
regimes, restricting flexibility in adjudication would be an
institutional step backwards, cutting off litigation-based access
to counterbalancing regulatory processes.33
The following sections first provide background
information on institutional evolution in response to changes to
31
E.g., Cristiano Antonelli, Localized Technological Change and the
Evolution of Standards as Economic Institutions, 6 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 195
(1994).
32
Both inside and outside of the courtroom, advancements in DNA
technology have radically altered the ways in which law enforcement procedures
are conducted. Improvements that have been made during the past quarter
century, in particular, have changed the playing field for making and overturning
criminal convictions. Today’s popular American crime scene investigation shows
frequently depict law enforcement personnel running DNA evidence through
powerful computers to settle cold or seemingly impossible cases. This is not
necessarily far from the truth, provided that acquired samples remain
uncompromised and are utilized in a sufficiently timely manner. Given
ideal
circumstances, and preferably with additional pieces of evidence or eyewitness
testimony, modern DNA technology can lead to a rapid and potent conviction (or
to the overturning of a wrongful conviction). In cases where DNA evidence is
incomplete or has been notably tainted in some way, the value of the DNA for
usage as court evidence lessens drastically. Michael Bobelian, DNA’s Dirty Little
Secret: A Forensic Tool Renowned for Exonerating the Innocent May Actually Be
Putting Them in Prison, WASH. MONTHLY (Mar. 1, 2010)
https://washingtonmonthly.com/2010/03/01/dnas-dirty-little-secret-2/.
33 This is not to say that parties cannot attempt to influence the regulatory
process outside litigation. Litigation does not preclude standard lobbying
channels. Yet, even if actively lobbying for rulemaking, defendants may still find
value in moving to stay or dismiss ongoing litigation through primary jurisdiction
referrals.
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measure and then discuss the evolution of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine over time. The fourth section examines
primary jurisdiction as institutional evolution, examining the
economic structure of primary jurisdiction through the lens of
transaction costs and institutional economics. It also considers
the counterargument that primary jurisdiction referrals
essentially are transaction costs. The conclusion returns to the
analogy by Frost: limiting the primary jurisdiction doctrine risks
“walling out” statistical-based claims from agencies, preserving
the creation of extractive quality-control regimes through
litigation.34
II. Scientific Resolving Power and Institutional Revolutions

A. Measurement Revolutions
One major theme of legal and economic history is that
institutions evolve in response to our ability to measure. For
example, meritocracy as a method of selecting one’s agents can
only exist when it is possible to measure merit.35 As many
outcomes depend on both individual effort and randomness, the
ability to measure when results are due to effort, rather than
chance, is critical for institutions. Many historical institutions
that we find perplexing, quaint, or antiquated often existed to
solve problems with measuring outcomes. For instance, the
existence of aristocracy might be explained by the need for the
Crown to resolve trust issues relating to measurement problems.
In a pre-industrialized era in which the natural world played an
enormous role in the variability of outcomes (from storms
disrupting shipping to messengers’ horses laming), the
aristocracy served as a social condition “designed to allow the
Frost, supra note 2.
ALLEN, supra note 11, at 4 (“Ours is a society based on a concept of merit,
and those who work hard and produce much expect to be rewarded. The race may
not always be to the swift, but the laborer is worthy of his hire, and we believe
that, with effort and a little luck, anyone can reach the top of the social ladder.”).
See DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP: HOW AMERICA’S
FOUNDATIONAL MYTH FEEDS INEQUALITY, DISMANTLES THE MIDDLE CLASS,
AND DEVOURS THE ELITE xii-xiv (2019) (discussing a counterpoint to merits of
meritocracy and how meritocracy preserves social divides and results in miserable
lives for the “winners” of the meritocratic system).
34
35
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members to credibly commit to being honest in their dealings
with the Crown and each other.”36 The aristocracy’s land served
as a kind of illiquid “hostage capital” insuring against difficultto-measure bad behavior as the nobility carried out the wishes
of the monarch.37 The need for powerful aristocracy declined as:
increased standardization, brought about by the
many innovations of the Industrial Revolution,
caused a significant fall in the variance of
production outcomes. This fall in variance allowed
workers to be monitored directly through
observation,
measurement
of
hours,
or
performance . . . These effects were felt deeply in
the offices of state. By 1871, the civil service began
staffing based on exam performance, professional
standards, and input monitoring which were too
costly before the age of detailed measurement . . .
As a result, the role of trust as the foundational
building block of public service was eroded. The
removal of trust as the basis of appointment
meant that the social institution designed to
generate that trust was no longer needed.38
Similar stories can be told across social history in a variety of
circumstances.
For example, consider dueling, private
lighthouses, and public policing. Dueling by aristocrats was a
natural extension of the need to be trusted—one’s Honor meant
one was trustworthy in an environment in which it is difficult to
measure trust.39 Private lighthouse provision declined as ships
were able to measure their locations more precisely and no
longer needed lighthouses as guides. 40 A public policing system
emerged as measurement capability increased and industrial

ALLEN, supra note 11, at 56.
Id., at 57 (“The threat of punishment was effective in binding the interests
between the Crown and its servants, most notable the aristocrats . . . Aristocrats
converted much of their wealth into forms that were costly to convert back, or,
more likely, became worthless if they fell out of favor.”).
38 Id. at 77.
39 Id. at 81.
40 Id. at 178.
36
37

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/3

12

2020

LIMITS OF MEASURMENT

97

processes became more precise, creating standardized goods
which made it inefficient for victims to prosecute theft.41

B.

Institutions and Jurisprudence

The influence of measurement error on historical
institutions is closely tied to its influence on modern
jurisprudence. Courts have difficulty awarding damages they
cannot measure. This basic point pervades the law, from the
doctrine of standing,42 to the limits of remedies in contract law,43
to the appropriate scope of tort law. 44 It also links law

Id.at 197-99.
Without an ability to at least theoretically measure harm, finding an
injury-in-fact or a redressable problem is problematic. This is tied to the idea of
a “concrete” injury and whether an injury is too “attenuated” for standing
purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 531 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“Standing measures the distance between the Intervenor’s demand and the
problem’s source.”) (emphasis added). See generally Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of
Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 618–19 (4th Cir. 2018); In re Sony
Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litigation, 903 F. Supp. 2d 942,
955 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Gulf Restoration Network, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries,
Serv., 730 F. Supp. 2d 157, 165 (D.D.C. 2010) .
43 If a court has no basis of calculating the benefit of one’s bargain, it cannot
award the benefit. For example, this is the basis of the foreseeability condition
precedent to expectation damages. Two classic cases are Rombola v. Cosindas,
351 Mass. 382, 385-86 (1966) (court awarded expectation damages to party
aggrieved by loss of race horse based on the ability to calculate probable damages
from past winnings) and Freund v. Wash. Square Press, 34 N.Y.2d 379, 381
(1974) (court declined to award expectation damages based on no prior publishing
history of plaintiff). See DANIEL MARKOVITS, CONTRACT LAW AND LEGAL
METHODS 41 (2014).
44 Tort law is defined generally as a set of civil remedies for wrongs, or
injuries. E.g., JENNY STEELE, TORT LAW: TEXT, CASES, & MATERIALS 3 (2017)
(defining torts generally). Generally speaking, the notion of justly redressing a
wrong entails that the amount of the wrong be susceptible to measurement.
Logically, if one cannot measure the harm, one cannot offer a fitting remedy.
Special cases like trespass to land are the exception—the act of trespass is viewed
as sufficiently egregious that actual damages need not be alleged to make a prima
facie case for the tort. Plaintiff’s attorneys have great incentive to move tort law
more towards the latter case. For example, medical monitoring torts attempt to
shirk these two standards by allowing purportedly measurable damages for the
mere prospect of injury, and are thus controversial. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz
& Cary Silverman, The Rise of “Empty Suit” Litigation: Where Should Tort Law
41
42
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inextricably with the sciences: law is not a discipline with
expertise in measurement, and so both hard and social sciences
have their days in court.45 Yet, even for a relationship made
amicable by consulting fees, this interdisciplinary alliance is
unsteady—the scope of what can potentially be measured is
constantly moving, the expertise required to perform and
understand those measurements changes, and law often finds
itself playing catch-up.46 The overlap between what the sciences
make possible and what courts find reliable evolves. The result
is a steady stream of decisions forming the cutting edge of
modern litigation.
For example, consider the effect of two related, refined
types of measurements on litigation, first from the perspective
of physical science and then from social science: the use of
modern laboratory equipment to measure food labeling claims in
consumer class actions and the rise of sophisticated economic
modeling to measure indirect harms in a variety of litigation
settings.47 For food labeling claims, scientific advancements
have opened an enormous range of testing for food
adulteration.48
These
include
molecular
techniques,

Draw the Line?, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 599, 601 (2014) quoting a plaintiff’s attorney
as noting:
If there were liability for every physical injury or actual
economic harm that occurs in America, I still would be limited
in my practice. There are only so many injuries. But if I were
allowed to recover damages and attorneys’ fees when there is
no injury, my potential return is unlimited.
45 Of course, one might call law itself a social science, which is debatable.
E.g., Geoffrey Samuel, Is Law Really a Social Science? A View from Comparative
Law, 67 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 288, 288 (2008) (noting the answer is “an ambiguous
one.”).
46 See Lingwall, supra note 16 (discussing analysis along these lines in the
class action setting).
47 See Lingwall, supra note 16, at 218–23 (discussing further history and
classification of plaintiff-side testing claims for food labeling).
48 These include many historical advances detailed in infra Section IV, but
also advancements in relatively recent years. See MODERN TECHNIQUES FOR
FOOD AUTHENTICATION xxi (Da-Wen Sun ed., 2nd ed. 2018) (noting that since
2008, “imaging spectrometry has rapidly emerged as and matured into a powerful
and fastest growing nondestructive tool for food authentication.”).
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chromatography, isotopic analysis, vibrational techniques,
elemental techniques, nuclear magnetic resonance, sensory
methods, and non-chromatographic mass spectrometry.49
Combined with easy access to laboratories willing to perform
these tests, this advent of widespread food testing by consumer
advocates has caused a revolution in consumer class actions.50
As illustrated in the introduction, a frequent strategy is to center
litigation on laboratory test results of the plaintiff’s product or
on reports of testing done on a product the plaintiff did not
purchase.51 This laboratory result then becomes the basis of the
complaint, flipping the script on traditional information
asymmetries in litigation. The test results become a powerful
bargaining chip to induce higher settlement values, as the

49 Georgios P. Danezis & Constantinos A. Georgiou, Food Authentication
by the Numbers, in FOOD AUTHENTICATION: MANGAGEMENT, ANALYSIS, &
REGULATION 19, 21 (Contantinos A. Georgiou & Georgios P. Danezis, eds.,
2017); see also Esteki, Regueiro & Simal-Gandara, supra note 16, at 430–31
(listing methods to test specific types of foods); D. Banerjee, S. Chowdhary, S.
Chakraborty & R. Bhattacharyya, Recent Advances in Detection of Food
Adulteration, in FOOD SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A PUBLIC HEALTH
PERSPECTIVE 129, 139-41 (Rajul Kumar Gupta, Puja Dudeja & Amarjeet Singh
Minhas, eds., 2017).
50 As late as 2000, one author noted of food adulteration that “at the bottom
line, no one wants to test. It is amazing that the marketplace is as fair as it is.”
E.C. WILHELMSEN, Adulteration Determination, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 3862-3888 (R.A. Meyers ed., 2000). See FREDERICK
ACCUM, A TREATISE ON ADULTERATIONS OF FOOD, AND CULINARY POISONS,
EXHIBITING THE FRAUDULENT SOPHISTICATIONS OF BREAD, BEER, WINE,
SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS, TEA, COFFEE, CREAM, CONFECTIONARY, VINEGAR,
MUSTARD, PEPPER, CHEESE, OLIVE OIL, PICKLES, AND OTHER ARTICLES
EMPLOYED IN DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND METHODS OF DETECTING THEM (1820)
(discussing further history and classification of plaintiff-side testing claims for
food labeling). As might be expected, Accum’s scholarship has not aged well.
See, e.g., JAMES SUMNER, Retailing Scandal: The Disappearance of Friedrich
Accum, in (RE)CREATING SCIENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 32
(Amanda Mordavsky Caleb, ed., 2007); P.J. Atkins, Social History of the Science
of Food Analysis and the Control of Adulteration, in THE HANDBOOK OF FOOD
RESEARCH 97–108 (A. Murcott, W. Belasco & P. Jackson, eds., 2013).
51 See, e.g., Lingwall, supra note 16, at 214–25 (describing plaintiff-side
testing in litigation over octopus, parmesan cheese, vitamins, tea, protein powder,
oatmeal, and so on).
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plaintiff brings quantitative evidence (or at least the veneer of
quantitative evidence) to the table.52
Courts confronted by product testing-based claims face a
difficult analysis. While the tests sometimes reveal substantive
problems with a product or “food fraud” as this literature might
term it, such as DNA testing revealing the substitution of one
ingredient for another, often the test reveals a minute harm.53
This harm may be within the tolerances set by FDA regulations
for food generally, but potentially contradicts a label claim. An
example of this is the stream of litigation over glyphosate in
products.54 Plaintiffs have tested a wide variety of goods labeled
as “natural” or “pure” and found the presence of small amounts
of glyphosate, an artificial pesticide.55 Although within the
tolerances for pesticides set by regulation, plaintiffs argued that
its presence in small amounts contradicted the labels.56 These
actions are often attacked on preemption and reasonableness
grounds through 12(b)(6) motions, and courts must weigh
whether they are the proper decision maker to adjudicate how
much contamination should be considered physically or
economically harmful. All foods, at the microscopic level at least,
are contaminated, and imposing liability under a

52 Cf. Sanne H. Knudsen, Adversarial Science, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1503, 1524
(2015) (“Contingent valuation aides lawyers in leveraging a sizeable settlement
from defendants, but it does not advance the understanding of harm to the
ecosystem in any scientific sense.”).
53 See Complaint at 2, Fonseca v. Goya Foods Inc., No. 5:16-cv-02559-LHK
(N.D. Cal. May 11, 2016). See also Andreas Schieber, Introduction to Food
Authentication, in MODERN TECHNIQUES FOR FOOD AUTHENTICATION 1-26 (DAWEN SUN ED., 2ND ED. 2018), supra note 49, at 1–3 (discussing the term food
fraud, including estimates that it occurs in 10% of all commercially sold foods)
(“There are several terms that have been used to characterize different incidents
in food, for example, food fraud, food adulteration, food crime, food terrorism,
food safety, and others . . . Food fraud is the term very often used in the relevant
literature . . . “).
54 Glyphosate is a common herbicide first registered for use in the United
States in 1974. See National Pesticide Information Center, Glyphosate: General
Fact Sheet, http://npic.orst.edu/factsheets/glyphogen.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2020). Prolonged exposure to glyphosate may cause a variety of health problems.
Id.
55 E.g., In re General Mills Glyphosate Litigation, No. 16-2869, 2017 WL
2983877, at *1 (D. Minn. July 12, 2017).
56 E.g., id.
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reasonableness standard requires someone draw a line between
contamination no reasonable person would be concerned with
and contamination a reasonable person would find substantive
enough to consider having suffered an economic loss.
Several recent cases illustrate variations on this testingbased theme. In 2017, the Sioux Honey Association Cooperative
was sued based on testing of their—ironically named—Sue Bee
Honey, which revealed the presence of trace amounts of
glyphosate.57 This allegedly violated label statements noting the
honey was “100% Pure,” and hence California consumer
protection law.58 The court considered the complaint, noting that
the litigation “although ostensibly about the meaning of the
terms ‘Pure’ or ‘100% Pure,’ is really about what constitutes a
safe level of glyphosate in honey.”59 It then referred the matter
to the FDA for potential determination of appropriate levels and
labeling regarding glyphosate in honey.60 Ultimately, the FDA
declined to address the matter.61
In 2019, a consumer advocacy group sued Twinnings North
America, alleging its Twinnings teas were labeled as “100%
natural” despite the presence of pesticides. “Tests conducted by
an independent laboratory using liquid chromatography mass
spectrometry” showed the presence of low amounts of
57 First Amended Class Action Complaint at36-37, Tran v. Sioux Honey
Ass’n Coop., No. 8:17–cv–110–JLS–JCGx, 2017 WL 5587276 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
11, 2017) (No. 8:17-cv-00110-JLS-SS) (C.D. Calif. Apr. 6, 2017).
58 Id. at 4, 109.
59 Tran v. Sioux Honey Ass’n Coop., No. 8:17–cv–110–JLS–JCGx, 2017
WL 5587276 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017) (noting that counsel at argument
distinguished between “bee leg versus biocide” when asked about contamination
with other substances, and concluding that the plaintiff’s “contention that she was
misled depends on the harmful nature of glyphosate.”).
60 Id. at 3 (“For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(c), the
Court REFERS to the FDA for an administrative determination the question of
whether and under what circumstances food products containing glyphosate may
or may not be labeled ‘Pure’ or ‘100% Pure.’ . . . The parties and counsel will
cooperate in expediting the presentation and explanation of this question to the
FDA and will notify the Court promptly of any determination by the FDA,
including any determination not to address the issue.”).
61 Re: Susan Tran v. Sioux Honey Assn’n, Coop., No. 8:17-cv-00110-JLSSS (C.D. Calif. Apr. 10, 2018) (letter from Susan Mayne, Director, Center for
Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, noting ongoing review of safety by the EPA
and declining to consider the matter in response to the referral).
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glyphosate, thiacloprid, and bifenthrin.62 Thiacloprid and
bifenthrin are insecticides that kill insects by disrupting their
nervous systems, either by direct contact or by ingesting plants
that absorbed the chemical.63 The FDA classifies these as
“likely” carcinogens, and so plaintiffs claimed violation of “pure”
or “natural” labeling statements were material to purchasing
decisions.64 The consumer group sought declaratory relief,
injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees.65
As the final example, a putative class action was filed
against Whole Foods in 2019, alleging its bottled Starkey water
contained arsenic despite labeling stating “Protected, Pure,
Unique” and “Untouched by surface contamination.”66 Arsenic,
“a metalloid chemical and known carcinogen that can lead to
reproductive harm, circulatory and nervous system disorders, an
increased risk of diabetes and hypertension, stomach pain and
nausea, vomiting and diarrhea, numbness, paralysis, blindness,
and other health problems,” was tested for arsenic with three
water samples.67 Consumer Reports found arsenic levels in two
samples at slightly under the ten parts-per-billion (ppb) federal
limit, with a third slightly over at 10.1 ppb.68 Based on this
testing by Consumer Reports, plaintiffs alleged an economic
loss, having paid more for the product than they otherwise would
have.69 As with the prior two examples, this became the basis of
alleged violation of various California consumer protection
laws.70
62 Complaint at 11-22, Organic Consumers Ass’n v. Twinnings N. Am., No.
2019-CA-004412-B (D.C. Sup. Ct. July 3, 2019).
63 Id. at 90–92.
64 Id. at 93.
65 Id. at 24.
66 Class Action Complaint for: 1. Violation of the Unfair Competition Law,
Bus. and Professions Code s 17200 et seq.; 2. Violation of the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act, Civil Code s 1750 et seq.; 3. Violations of the Ill. Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Bus. Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 501/1, et seq.; and 4. Unjust
Enrichment at 2, Berke v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-07471 (C.D.
Cal. filed Aug. 28, 2019), No. 2:19-cv-07471.
67 Id. at 2, 4.
68 Id. at 4.
69 Id. at 21.
70
As an additional example not involving low level contamination,
consumers brought a class action lawsuit against Trader Joes in 2019, alleging the
company defrauded consumers by charging for excess retained water in their
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Once plaintiffs in these actions have discovered potential
adulteration, they must tie the adulteration to a legal remedy.
This connection is premised on the ability to connect
contamination to a theory of economic loss. In the examples
considered above involving pesticide presence in food, plaintiffs
generally have two options to provide an ascertainable loss.
First, they can claim the products were worthless as sold, which
should result in a refund of the full purchase price to consumers.
Courts may be reluctant to consider the product valueless, and
if so, the economic value lost from the adulteration can be
difficult to quantify. For example, in a “natural” oatmeal which
has tested positive for the presence of glyphosate, in theory the
damages are the price differential between the product labeled
as “natural” and the product lacking that label statement.
Unless the defendant has sold two identical versions of the
oatmeal across markets, charging a higher price for the
“natural” labelled product, ascertaining the loss due to the
“natural” statement depends on statistical modeling.
Fortunately for the plaintiffs in these actions, advances in
statistics and economic theory have enabled increasingly
persuasive measurement of a consumer’s loss in these
situations. As with the hard sciences, the more advanced the
social science, the greater the potential measurability of harm.71
Before the advent of economic or statistical theory it would be
implausible to attempt to measure the economic loss from
chicken—retained water is water left over from processing that remains in
packaging. Complaint at ¶¶ 39–45, 62–82, Webb v. Trader Joe’s Company, No.
3:19-cv-01587-CAB-WVG (Sup. Ct. Cal. Cnty. of San Diego, Aug. 23, 2019).
The plaintiffs used random sampling to test 14 Trader Joe’s chicken products.
Using an “analytical food laboratory” and a “calibrated legal-for-trade scale in
accordance with applicable . . . regulations,” the plaintiffs found that Trader Joe’s
products contained statistically significant more amounts of retained water than
was advertised. Id. This again allegedly violated various California laws, as when
class members “pay the marked price per pound” they paid “for excess Retained
Water.” Id. at 129–251, 169.
71
This point has generated controversy within economics, with some
scholars pushing for increased emphasis on practical significance. E.g., Deirdre
N. McCloskey & Stephen T. Ziliak, The Standard Error of Regressions, 34 J.
ECON. LIT. 97, 97 (1996) (arguing that statistical findings “can be permanent . . .
without being ‘significant’ in other senses, such as for science or policy. And a
difference can be significant for science or policy and yet be insignificant
statistically”).
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minute contamination, and before the advent of econometric
regression techniques, ascertaining that loss through modeling
would be difficult to perform. With these techniques, for
example, if a slate of similar products and their prices can be
assembled with variation in their label statements, it may be
possible to identify the effect of “natural” or “pure” on the label
using cross-product comparisons and statistical assumptions. 72
Although the terminology “resolving power” is typically used in
the hard-scientific sense, modeling revolutions in social science
fields may similarly be thought of as increasing the resolving
power of their disciplines. Together, increased resolving power
of product testing and increased social-scientific “resolving
power” mean that plaintiffs can turn minute harms, previously
the domain of regulatory bodies, into potentially actionable
litigation. The next section considers the relationship between
these litigation efforts and potential regulators.
III.

Origins and Background of the Primary Jurisdiction
Doctrine

A.

Development of the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine

To consider the effects of advances in the hard and social
sciences on primary jurisdiction, it is useful to review the
doctrine’s principles and origins, particularly with the presentday academic push to limit the doctrine closer to these roots. Put
simply, primary jurisdiction is a discretionary doctrine which
helps promote relationships between courts and administrative
agencies. It was conceived as a mechanism for bypassing
potential adjudicatory problems by allowing an agency to have
say when an issue is within the agency’s purview but the case
itself is still in the jurisdiction of the court. 73 Courts can invoke
72 See, e.g., In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 919, 944-46 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 23, 2015) (working through two separate damages models to ascertain
a loss from “natural” labeling).
73
See Winters, supra note 10 exploring the doctrine’s origins, which
examinesit in modern context, and arguing that many cases are being referred for
agency advice without first finding the referral necessary, that this often causes
needless and harmful delay, and that courts should confine the doctrine to ratesetting and labor dispute cases, replacing primary jurisdiction advice referral with
other mechanisms that better facilitate agency participation).
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the doctrine and thereby stay or dismiss proceedings of a case
for the purpose of passing their power over to appropriate
government agencies.74 The doctrinal theory is that under
certain circumstances, uniformity and consistency can be better
attained by allowing these agencies, rather than the federal
courts, to have discretion in a case. This is because acquaintance
with certain intricate facts is commonly found only among a
body of experts. Invoking primary jurisdiction can potentially be
a more efficient course of action rather than courts developing
expertise or attempting to create uniform national standards
without national jurisdiction.75
The doctrine has its origins in a few historic twentieth
century rate-setting incidents.76 One such incident was the
notable 1907 case Texas & Pacific RR Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil
Co.77 There, Abilene sued to recover a sum of money that had
been demanded and coercively collected by Texas & Pacific at a
rate it alleged to be unjust and unreasonable. At this time,
shipping rates and schedules were being determined by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). However, Abilene tried
to bypass the ICC by taking their case straight to federal court.
The railroad insisted instead that the situation be heard by the
ICC, stating that the ICC alone had authority and competence
to determine the reasonableness of the rates under
consideration. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed, and
maintained that, even if the matter were indeed cognizable in
the courts, the ICC should be consulted first, since there were

74 E.g., Viggiano v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CV 14-7250-DMG (MRWx),
2016 WL 5110500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2016) (“The primary jurisdiction
doctrine permits courts to stay proceedings or dismiss an action without prejudice
pending resolution of a matter within the special competence of an administrative
agency.”).
75 See Aaron J. Lockwood, The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine: Competing
Standards of Appellate Review, 64 Wᴀsʜ. & Lᴇᴇ L. Rᴇᴠ. 707, 735 (2007)
(discussing efficiency).
76 See Bryson Santaguida, The Primary Jurisdiction Two-Step, 74 Uɴɪᴠ.
Cʜɪᴄ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1517, 1519 (2007).
77 Texas & Pacific RR Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907)
(this case is widely agreed to be the start of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, with
additional, important rate-setting cases following soon after).
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technical and policy considerations within the agency’s
particular field of expertise:
the state court was without jurisdiction to
entertain the cause, and even if such court had
jurisdiction, it could not, without disregarding the
act to regulate commerce, grant relief upon the
basis that the established rate was unreasonable,
when it had not been found to be so by the
Interstate Commerce Commission.78
Also mentioned was:
if the power existed in both courts and the
Commission to originally hear complaints on this
subject, there might be a divergence between the
action of the Commission and the decision of a
court. In other words, the established schedule
might be found reasonable by the Commission in
the first instance and unreasonable by a court
acting originally, and thus a conflict would arise
which would render the enforcement of the act
impossible.79
Abilene laid the groundwork for what would eventually come to
be known as the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The Supreme
Court was arriving at the conclusion that having a federal
agency, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, handle
the case would create a nationwide imperative, allowing for
greater uniformity and unbiased decision making.80
A few decades later, two additional common-carrier ratesetting cases helped to solidify parameters and core features of
the doctrine—Far East Conference v. United States and United
Id. at 431.
Id. at 441.
80 See Richard M. Travis, Primary Jurisdiction: A General Theory and Its
Application to the Securities Exchange Act, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 926, 932 (1975)
(“The traditional doctrine called primary jurisdiction . . . rested upon interests of
‘uniformity’ and ‘expertise’ . . . Neither policy should be used merely as a vehicle
to accord uncritical deference to agencies or to substitute judicial judgment for
that of Congress on the role of regulation in particular industries.”).
78
79
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States v. Western Pacific RR Co. Far East, which took place in
1952, helped to further organize the doctrine as one which
promotes the beneficial use of agency expertise.81 The case
involved the United States filing an antitrust action against a
conference of maritime freight carriers who had created their
own dual-rate shipping system. The conference moved for
dismissal so that the Federal Maritime Board could give the
dual-rate issues preliminary consideration. When the case found
its way to the Supreme Court, the Court noted “[t]heir business
involves questions of an exceptional character, the solution of
which may call for the exercise of a high degree of expert and
technical knowledge.”82 The Court then asserted that these
issues could more straightforwardly be resolved by the Federal
Maritime Board than by the district court:
in cases raising issues of fact not within the
conventional experience of judges or cases
requiring the exercise of administrative
discretion, agencies created by Congress for
regulating the subject matter should not be
passed over.83
Far East maintained Abilene’s original position of promoting
comity between courts and agencies. However, it changed
primary jurisdiction doctrine from being a tool used to discern
the location of exclusive jurisdiction into one intended to
facilitate appropriate use of an agency’s specialized knowledge.
Advancing the doctrine’s fundamentals to concerns beyond
uniformity made sense to a large degree, non-uniform decisions
come both because of fractured adjudicative bodies but also
because those bodies possess differing levels of expertise, and
thus would not be expected to come to uniform decisions. 84

81 See Cunningham, supra note 10, at 2-5 (exploring the doctrine’s origin
by showing how the twentieth century rate-setting cases created the doctrine’s
initial core purposes, noting the doctrine lacks clear boundaries, and suggesting
there should be uncomplicated guidelines for its future usage).
82 Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573 (1952).
83 Id. at 574.
84 Cf. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants’ Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922)
(“Whenever a rate, rule, or practice is attacked as unreasonable or as unjustly
discriminatory, there must be preliminary resort to the Commission . . . the
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Four years later, in 1956, United States v. Western Pacific
RR Co. helped to further infuse the idea of promotion of working
relationships between court and agency into the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.85 The Western Pacific decision showcases a
far more modern framework for the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction and is possibly the doctrine’s most cited opinion.86
The case once again involved a dispute regarding reasonable
shipping rates. It also entailed a question about the formal
definition of an incendiary bomb. In the case, a shipment of 211
steel bomb canisters full of napalm gel were shipped by three
railroads for the United States Army.
The federal government initially paid the railroad
companies the rate required for incendiary bombs. However,
because the canisters had no burster chargers or fuses, the
government afterward contended that they ought only to have
paid the much lower rate required for gas canisters. 87 The Court
of Claims made an initial ruling which favored the shipping
companies, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded it.
The Supreme Court stated that courts should consult
administrative agencies when dealing with technical matters
such as construction of explosives or scheduling of tariff rates.88
In ever clearer terms, primary jurisdiction was spelled out
during the case. It:
. . . applies where a claim is originally cognizable
in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such a case the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its views.89

enquiry is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters; and
uniformity can be secured only if its determination is left to the Commission.”).
85 United States v. Western Pacific RR Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
86 Cunningham, supra note 10, at 13.
87 Western Pacific RR Co., 352 U.S. at 61.
88 Id. at 66.
89 Id. at 64.
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The Supreme Court recognized the authority the courts have,
yet it emphasized the need for courts to work in harmony with
administrative agencies by consulting them for their opinions on
technical matters such as in defining an incendiary bomb or
determining appropriate railroad tariff rates.90
Finally, it is important to note that, in the Western Pacific
case, the Court made the now famous statement that “[n]o fixed
formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the reasons for the
existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes
it serves will be aided by its application in the particular
litigation.”91 Like many judge-made legal doctrines, primary
jurisdiction was left as prudential and without definite
boundaries, a fact that has invited expansive use by defendants
and critiques by academics.92

B.

Where the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine Stands Today

Since its inception through twentieth century rate-setting
cases, the doctrine has seen widespread and varied usage. Food
labeling, beyond the testing-based claims discussed above, has
frequently seen primary jurisdiction arguments.93 Much food
labeling litigation, including the product testing actions
considered here, has focused on the unregulated term
“natural.”94 When the FDA proposed potential regulation for the
expression, many defendants attempted to invoke the primary
jurisdiction doctrine to stay their cases pending a decision by the
FDA. Some successfully reasoned that national uniformity from
a regulatory agency might be preferable to ad-hoc adjudication

Id. at 63.
Id. at 64.
92 See Cunningham, supra note 10, at 2–5.
93 See Bradley W. Pratt, The Pathway to Primary Jurisdiction, A.B.A. (Aug.
10, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/productsliability/articles/2015/pathway-to-primary-jurisdiction/.
94 E.g., George v. Blue Diamond Growers, No. 4:15-CV-962 (CEJ), 2016
WL 1464644, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 14, 2016); Forsher v. The J.M. Smucker Co.,
No. CV 2015-7180 (RDJ)(MDG), 2016 WL 5678567, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2016), Kane v. Chobani, LLC, 645 Fed. Appx. 593, 593 (2016); See generally
Winters, supra note 10 (criticizing use of primary jurisdiction in food labeling).
90
91
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by courts. For a typical example, In re Kind LLC “Healthy & All
Natural” Litigation centered around Kind’s alleged deceptive
marketing practices of their food items, listing as “natural” foods
that contain “synthetic, chemically synthesized, and highly
processed ingredients such as soy lecithin, soy protein isolate,
citrus pectin, glucose syrup, vegetable glycerine, palm kernel oil,
canola oil, ascorbic acid, vitamin A acetate, D-Alpha tocopheryl
acetate, and annatto,” and that “[t]esting has detected the
presence of GMOs” in some Kind products. 95
Primary jurisdiction has also been invoked in the opioid
epidemic, with defendants invoking the FDA’s oversight on
prescription drugs.96 In particular, the FDA has been referred to
concerning opioid narcotics such as Vicodin, morphine, and
codeine. These mass produced substances contain potent
chemical agents which replicate the action of endorphins and are
commonly used as medications for relief of intense pain or
alleviation of severe depression. Unfortunately, the euphoric
high achievable through the drugs, coupled with allegations of
major fraud of product mislabeling and false advertising
practices by the producing companies, have led to widespread
misuse, tolerance, addiction, and even death. This has resulted
in mass litigation, with primary jurisdiction again being used as
an agency referral method.97 Other areas generating primary
jurisdiction referrals are labor disagreements applied to the
National Labor Relations Board, antitrust issues, complicated
environmental debates, and Medicare and Medicaid disputes
referred to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.98
Despite being a popular tool in legal practice from defendants
seeking stays and dismissals, academics have developed mixed
feelings about the doctrine, particularly with respect to its use
as an advice referral method. The central practical argument is
that these motions can cause a long or even indefinite delay,
which has potential to add to litigation expenses and harm the

95 In Re: Kind LLC “Healthy and all Natural” Litigation, 387 F. Supp. 3d
457, 461 (2018). The court stayed the case pending action from the FDA.
96 See Catherine T. Struve, Greater and Lesser Powers of Tort Reform: The
Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and State-Law Claims Concerning FDA-Approved
Products, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1039, 1039 (2008).
97 See Cunningham, supra note 10, passim.
98 See Winters, supra note 10, at 553–54 (cataloguing cases).
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speedy resolution of disputes.99 The argument goes that in cases
requiring exclusive agency jurisdiction, having a delay may be
relevant, since the agency must give a ruling before the case can
proceed. With an advice referral case, however, the delay is often
needless, and may be especially damaging if the case presents
safety issues, such as leaving a product with a misleading label
with health consequences on shelves. For this reason, some feel
that the primary jurisdiction doctrine should be re-confined to
cases involving rate-settings and labor disputes, and that courts
should make use of other mechanisms to facilitate agency
participation.100
An additional, commonly-cited concern is that the doctrine
seems to lack definite borders or boundaries.101 Even its name,
primary jurisdiction, can be misleading, since the concept is
prudential in nature and not necessarily about a district court
lacking jurisdiction to adjudicate.102 As such, it represents “a bit
99

See Access Telecomms. v Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 137 F.3d 605, 605

(1998).
100 We address these questions later, but as an initial note, one solution may
be for a court to limit the negative effects of a delay by specifically limiting a
stay’s length. For instance, a court could refer a case to an administrative agency,
while specifying that if the agency does not make a ruling within a set, reasonable
amount of time, the court would rescind the referral order and decide the matter
on its own terms. See, e.g., American Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Massachusetts Dep’t
of Envtl. Protection, 163 F.3d 74, 75 (1998):

For example, a court might refer a matter to an administrative
agency, explicitly providing, however, that if the agency fails
to rule within a reasonable amount of time, the court would
either vacate the referral order and decide the matter itself, or
issue an order under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), which authorizes courts
to ‘compel agency action . . . unreasonably delayed. (footnotes
omitted).
101 See Winters, supra note 10, at 241 (characterizing primary jurisdiction
as an “ill-defined” doctrine).
102 See Hilary G. Buttrick & Courtney Droms Hath, Pomegranate Juice Can
Do That? Navigating the Jurisdictional Landscape of Food Health Claim
Regulation in a Post-Pom Wonderful World, 49 IND. L. REV. 267, 289 (2016)
(discussing primary jurisdiction together with preemption and preclusion in
context of food labeling); Jeffrey R. Babbin, Developments in the Second Circuit:
2001-2002, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1565, 1616–17 (2003) (discussing the difficulty
inherent in using “jurisdiction” inside the term “primary jurisdiction,” quoting
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of an enigma in U.S. jurisprudence,”103 where “myths and
misconceptions abound, and . . . are shared by litigants, lawyers,
and even judges.”104 Ironically for a doctrine designed to promote
uniformity, this criticism highlights a lack of uniformity
amongst courts in the tests or factors to use deciding whether or
not to apply the doctrine. It has likely been inappropriately
utilized in many novel or difficult issues without closely
adhering to one or more of the doctrine’s three original, core
purposes.105 Finally, primary jurisdiction may damage the
regulatory process by altering the way agencies prioritize issues,
and by removing state law benefits from parties.106
IV.

Primary Jurisdiction as Institutional Evolution

This Section considers primary jurisdiction in light of
institutional evolution and increased scientific ability to
measure potential harms. The discussion of English peerage,
duels, and criminal law reform above each illustrated two
central principles: individuals respond to the incentives they are
given, and changes in the ability to measure change incentives
in powerful ways. As the ability to monitor complex public policy
situations improved, there was less need for a land-based
peerage system to incentivize proper behavior.107 As trust
became less of an institutional issue, one’s personal reputation
for honor became less critical for economic success and dueling
Guido Calabresi as noting the term is “singularly infections” and that “[t]he Holy
Roman Empire was ‘neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. . . . It was effective
nonetheless.’ Similarly, ‘primary jurisdiction’ can be used to denominate what
should be done in cases of this sort. And, so long as the words are not treated as
implying what they do not intend, little harm will flow from this terminology.”)
(quoting MFS Sec. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 277 F.3d 613, 621-22 (2d Cir.
2002)).
103
Catherine M. Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of
Preemption, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 359, 384 (2014).
104 Richard Welch, Demystifying Primary Jurisdiction Referrals, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION BLOG (July 29, 2010, 10:00 AM),
https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2010/07/29/demystifying-primaryjurisdiction-referrals.
105 Id.
106 See Winters, supra note 10, at 240.
107 See ALLEN, supra note 11.
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as means of protecting honor faded, and so on.108 In sum,
technology changes incentives, and incentives change behavior.

A. Adjudicators of Testing-Based Quality Control Issues
Just as in these historical situations, as pre-suit resolving
power in product testing increases, what was previously
unmeasurable becomes measurable. This changes the incentives
of litigants.109 As the costs involved in product testing declined,
both in access to new testing techniques, laboratories, and the
opportunity cost of attorney time to engage product testing,
rational plaintiffs’ attorneys turned to testing to drive litigation.
While the plaintiffs’ bar in food litigation had justifiably earned
the moniker “the food police” from frustrated defendants, as they
adopted regulatory-style testing they took on this mantle in a
fuller sense.110 Now, rather than just bringing actions to enforce
label claims in the presence of limited FDA enforcement actions,
attorneys began taking on the role of quality-control regulators.
What was traditionally a regulatory domain had entered
litigation.
Once quality-control testing seeped into the courts, several
possibilities existed to handle these claims. First, courts could
deal with these claims “in house” using traditional screening
doctrines. Twombly and Iqbal allow courts to screen for
reasonableness under Rule 12(b)(6) motions, so a court can
examine the complaint in a product testing action and conclude
Id.
In particular, the successful use of product-testing in pleadings through
higher settlements or victories in 12(b)(6) motions encourages other plaintiffs’
attorneys to pursue the same strategy. Litigation is generally a competitive
marketplace, and plaintiffs’ attorneys follow trends in litigation closely. See, e.g.,
John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions:
Why “Exit” Works Better than “Voice”, 30 CARD. L. REV. 407, 407 (2008) (noting
“[a] sizable literature on class actions has long suggested that the plaintiff’s
attorney is an independent entrepreneur”). This extends from formal conferences,
such as the National Trial Lawyers Summit, to sniping legal theories that have
resulted in success. Product testing begets product testing. For defendants,
knowing product-testing litigation is possible likely changes their assessments of
the costs and benefits of labeling decisions.
110
U.S. CHAMBER: INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE FOOD COURT:
TRENDS IN FOOD AND BEVERAGE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION (2017).
108
109
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that no reasonable consumer would consider their purchase
deceptive despite the test results.111 If the complaint is based on
testing yet fails to disclose the results of the test, or if the
complaint only alleges that future testing will yield damaging
results, then defendants can claim that fraud-based claims have
not been pled with particularity under Rule 8.112 Or, if federal
law speaks to the testing at issue, it may be possible to construct
a preemption defense based on regulated quality control
standards.113
The disadvantage of these techniques is that policing
adulteration standards through court decisions leaves a
patchwork, ad-hoc, and unpredictable environment for
producers. In this environment, nationally-relevant quality
control standards are subject to the vagaries of local courts. As
attorneys working in labeling quickly realize, one court’s
reasonableness is another’s unreasonableness, and one court’s
preemption argument is quickly distinguished by another.114
Although each particular litigation centers on the question of
whether the reasonable consumers in the state-based class have
been deceived by a particular product, taken together, multiple
litigations over nationally-marketed products, centered around
the same testing-based themes, create ad-hoc policy surrounding
the testing claims.
While states may serve as quasi-experimental laboratories
in many situations, food labeling litigation is generally an
exception. Labeling litigation generally concerns national-level
production, as products are marketed nationally to take
advantage of economies of scale. A negative decision in one state
then inherently applies across the nation, and the result is not
that producers create unique state-by-state labels, with quasiexperimental results giving optimal policy among these labels.115
111
See Lingwall, supra note 16, at 227–39 (discussing the consumer
protection labeling setting).
112 See id.
113 Id.
114 Compare Reynolds v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 4:14cv381-MW/CAS,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53405, at *19–37 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2015), with
Stansfield v. Minute Maid Co.,124 F. Supp.3d 1226, 1235-37 (2015)
(distinguishing Reynolds).
115 E.g., Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in
the Children’s Health Insurance Program, 50 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 294, 294–95
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Instead, producers wishing to avoid liability must follow
standards set by the most extreme adjudicators, giving
inordinate power to local courts to create national-level policy.
This creates a situation in which the parties generate
externalities well beyond the litigation at hand, and the
resulting national-level implications created are the result of
one-off litigation rather than national-level democratic
processes.116 The resulting policy is likely to please the victor in
the litigation, but perhaps not be socially optimal. For these
reasons, as a solution to what is at heart a policy question—what
level of contamination is acceptable in food with certain claims—
court-based adjudication is wanting.117
(2006) (discussing the diffusion of state-level policies as “successful states’
policies were emulated” across the nation).
116 E.g., Mendelson, supra note 23, at 1343–46.
117 Due to national-level product markets and the prohibitive costs involved
in state-specific labeling or state-specific quality control standards, decisions in
quality-control areas by state-level adjudicators have the practical effect of
nationwide injunctions. For a critique, see Dep’t of Homeland Security v. New
York, 589 U.S. __ (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring):
The real problem here is the increasingly common practice of
trial courts ordering relief that transcends the cases before them.
Whether framed as injunctions of ‘nationwide,’ ‘universal,’ or
‘cosmic’ scope, these orders share the same basic flaw—they
direct how the defendant must act towards persons who are not
parties to the case. . . As the brief and furious history of the
regulation before use illustrates, the routine issuance of
universal injunctions is patently unworkable, sowing chaos for
litigants, the government, courts, and all those affected by these
conflicting decisions. . .. [B]oth sides have been forced to rush
from one preliminary injunction hearing to another, leaping
from one emergency stay application to the next, each with
potentially nationwide stakes . . .. And the stakes are
asymmetric. If a single successful challenge is enough to stay
the challenged rule, the government’s hope of implementing
any new policy could face the long odds of a straight sweep,
parlaying a 94-to-0 win in the district courts into a 12-to-0
victory in the courts of appeal. A single loss and the policy goes
on ice . . ..” (emphasis added).
Similarly in the labeling regime, nationwide product markets mean defendants
must satisfy the most extreme state-level adjudicator to market their products
nationally.

31

116

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 40.2

Second, agencies could envelop these claims under new
regulation. Federal agencies are aware of litigation trends and
could—at their own impetus—initiate regulation to preempt
developing issues in the courts. This requires an administration
willing to take action in the face of ongoing litigation. It also
takes an administration not under pressure to relieve a
perceived over-abundance of regulations. Given the wide variety
of testing-based litigation, policing every type of adulteration
through new regulation would unleash a large new regulatory
scope over much of the economy due to the incredible
sophistication of modern testing techniques and the number of
issues they can find.118 If de-regulation is the watchword in
Washington, this is unlikely to occur.
As a third alternative, increased use of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine can provide a middle ground. It avoids a
continual, potentially contradictory series of one-off decisions by
courts each facing essentially the same question, and it avoids
extending regulation beyond the reach of what parties find
worthwhile to litigate.119

B.

Primary Jurisdiction to Adjudicate

Despite many academic criticisms, including delay and
failure to preserve Congressional intent for dual-regulatory
systems, primary jurisdiction may serve as an attractive dispute
resolution method in this quasi-regulatory context. To show this,
it is first instructive to break down primary jurisdiction into two
major motivations for its application. Following von Mehren and
Trautman’s famed division of “jurisdiction to adjudicate” into
specific jurisdiction (based on the events at issue in the case)
and general jurisdiction (based on the presence of the defendant)
which the Supreme Court adopted through its Daimler and
Bristol-Meyers Squibb line of cases, it is useful to categorize

See, e.g., Danezis & Georgiou, supra note 49, at 21.
Cf., e.g., Linda R. Stanley & Don L. Coursey, Empirical Evidence on the
Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
145, 147–50 (1990) (modeling law and economics approaches to settling versus
litigating). Similar analysis encompasses the decision to pursue any form of legal
remedies for small harms.
118
119
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primary jurisdiction as two aspects: general primary jurisdiction
and specific primary jurisdiction.120
In our terminology, general primary jurisdiction denotes
primary jurisdiction invoked when courts have expertise to
efficiently adjudicate the matter at hand, but feel agency
rulemaking or adjudication would be beneficial due to more
general concerns with uniformity, federalism, dual-regulatory
schemes, and so on.121 This lies close to the original justification
for primary jurisdiction in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. 122 There,
the Court worried that “unless all courts reached an identical
conclusion a uniform standard of rates in the future would be
impossible, as the standard would fluctuate and vary, dependent
upon the divergent conclusions reached as to reasonableness by
the various courts called upon to consider the subject as an
original question.”123
In contrast, specific primary jurisdiction denotes primary
jurisdiction invoked for case-specific reasons, such as by the
need for specific agency expertise or case-specific efficiency.124

120
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). The
Supreme Court essentially adopted von Mehren and Trautman’s analysis in its
personal jurisdiction cases; Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) (limiting
personal jurisdiction); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (categorizing
personal jurisdiction as either specific, general, or non-existent); Bristol-Myers
Squibb v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (applying Daimler in the mass
litigation context).
121 Efficiency may be a concern with general primary jurisdiction, but it is
efficiency beyond the specific case at hand, such as concerns that non-uniform
adjudication leads to a risky, unpredictable, and costly legal landscape which
would be inefficient for parties in general. For example, consider the discussion
of uniformity in infra note 132 and accompanying text. For a general critique of
the idea that primary jurisdiction can promote uniformity at all, see Lauren
Kostman, The Natural Response to Adjudicating Current Litigation When the
Creation of a Related Agency Rule Is Simultaneously Underway, 41 CARDOZO L.
REV. 353, 384-85 (2019).
122 Abilene, 204 U.S. at 431–41.
123 Id. at 440.
124 See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 686 F.3d 832, 838 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (noting “the primary jurisdiction doctrine is rooted in part in judicial
efficiency; if an agency has particular expertise in an area, then invoking the
primary jurisdiction doctrine could ‘enhance court decision-making and
efficiency by allowing the court to take advantage of [that] administrative
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This lies closer to the reasoning Justice Brandeis added to the
motivations for invoking primary jurisdiction in Great Northern
Railway Co.125 There, efficiently resolving the dispute required
understanding
“many
intricate
facts”
which
would
“commonly . . . be found only in a body of experts.” 126 For
example, in this usage specific primary jurisdiction was invoked
in Access Telecommunications v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co. when plaintiffs alleged certain technical violations of federal
law establishing standards for wiring phone service.127 The
defendant had filed a schedule of charges for telephone service
which had been approved by the FCC. The schedule set certain
transmission standards for, e.g., “attenuation distortion, echo
control, impulse noise, and phase jitter.” 128 Defendant had
established a 6,000 foot limit for using certain types of wire, due
to problems with meeting transmission standards, while
plaintiffs argued this violated the terms of the approved rate
schedule, and hence federal law.129 The court reasoned that (1)
reasonableness of a rate was within the statutory authority of
the FCC, and (2) the “FCC has far more expertise than the courts
on matters such as circuit designs, signal transmissions, noise
attenuation, and echo return loss. Thus, the need to draw upon
the FCC’s expertise and experience is present here.”130
expertise.’”) (quoting Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042,
1051 (9th Cir. 2000)).
125 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants’ Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
126 Id. at 291.
127 Access Telecommunications v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 137 F.3d 605 (8th Cir.
1997).
128 Id. at 607.
129 Id. at 608.
130 Id. at 609. See Tran v. Sioux Honey Ass’n Coop., No. 8:17-cv-00110JLS-SS, 2017 WL 5587276, at *1 (C.D. Calif. Oct. 11, 2017) (referring to the
FDA for an “opportunity to bring its expertise to bear on appropriate tolerance
levels for glyphosate in honey and on labeling requirements regarding the same,”
“the EPA and FDA have the requisite expertise to evaluate this research and
determine what levels of glyphosate in honey can be considered ‘safe’ and
whether consumers should be informed of its presence through labeling,” and that
“[n]ot only does the FDA have experience defining such terms for food
labeling . . . but it has the re to gather facts and comments from the wider public
to help define the term”); See generally Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins.
Co.. 225 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that “efficiency” and “expertise”
would not be enhanced with a primary jurisdiction referral, because the court had
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The concepts of specific and general primary jurisdiction
are related. Highly technical matters risk being misunderstood
by non-specialists, and so uniformity is more likely to occur
when issued from a central body of experts. For example, in
finding the need for primary jurisdiction in the antitrust case
Far East Conference v. United States, the Court first appealed
to expertise. It noted that facts “generally unfamiliar to a
judicial tribunal, but well understood by an administrative body
especially trained and experienced in . . . intricate and technical
facts” was “better equipped than courts by specialization” to
resolve the case.131 Then in the same breath, the court noted
“[u]niformity and consistency in the regulation of business . . .
are secured.”132 In other words, a lack of judicial expertise risks
lack of uniformity.
C. Resolving Power, Efficiency, and Transaction Costs in
Adjudication
With this framework for primary jurisdiction, consider the
effect of increased scientific resolving power on the institutional
relationship between courts and agencies. This Section considers
this relationship in light of transaction costs, how scientific
change alters those transaction costs, how altered transaction
costs change the incentives of litigants, and how those altered
incentives play out in light of institutional frameworks.
In a Coasean analysis, it can be instructive to first consider
a simplified version of the world without many of the transaction
costs that apply in practice.133 In this simplified world, first
already decided a key factual issue, and then noting that because of the “extremely
rare” facts at hand, “there would have been little uniformity to gain by referring”
the matter to an agency).
131 Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573–75 (1952).
132 Id. at 574.
133 The literature on the Coase theorem is perhaps the largest in all of social
science. See Steven G. Medema, 1966 And All That: Codification, Consolidation,
Creep, and Controversy in the Early History of the Coase Theorem, 36 J. ECON.
THOUGHT 271, 273-75 (2014) (discussing how the Coase Theorem was “codified”
into economic thought through the efforts of George Stigler). See also Lee Anne
Fennel, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (2013)
(“In The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase firmly installed transaction costs
at the center of the economic analysis of law. The potential for these costs to
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consider how the parties would react to the creation of a rule
governing testing claims, and then consider the process by which
the rule could be created. If litigation, regulation, and
alternative dispute resolution were frictionless, then whether
courts or agencies were tasked with establishing rules for
testing-based claims would be immaterial. Indeed, the rules
themselves would be immaterial. In such a world, parties would
costlessly gather and share all the information relevant to their
position on a label, and potential plaintiffs and defendants would
bargain to efficient outcomes regardless of the rule established.
For example, in our food labeling situation, suppose society
wished to establish the limit for when label statements such as
“Real,” “Natural,” or “Simple” were violated by contamination
with artificial substances.134 There is a trade-off between the
societal value of the descriptor (aiding consumers in purchasing
decisions) and the costs of complying with the standards of the
rule (producer supply chain monitoring, production-line quality
control, and so on).135 Suppose further that the societally
efficient rule, that is, the one that maximized the sum of the
welfare of all consumers and producers, was ten parts per
billion.136 A less strict standard would decrease the value added

inconveniently interpose themselves between the world as we know it and an idea
of perfect efficiency has provided generations of law and economics scholars with
an analytic North Star.”).
134 See Shyam Narayan Jha, Food Standards and Permissible Limits, in
RAPID DETECTION OF FOOD ADULTERANTS AND CONTAMINANTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 63 (Shyam Narayan Jha, ed., 2016) (discussing the permissible limits
and food standards with health concerns). See, e.g., LAW360, Swiss Miss Hot
Cocoa Ingredients Not So ‘Simple,’ Buyers Say (Nov. 20, 2019),
https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/articles/1221707/swiss-miss-hot-cocoaingredients-not-so-simple-buyers-say?nl_pk=bcb58e84-93b2-4da6-99e5a98e96f90cccK (discussing litigation over whether “simple” on Swiss Miss label
was violated by inclusion of alkalized cocoa).
135 The costs of complying with food regulation can be extensive—these
costs are themselves the subject of academic study. E.g., John M. Antle, Benefits
and Costs of Food Safety Regulation, 24 FOOD POL’Y 605, 609 (1999) (discussing
academic modeling of the costs involved in complying with food safety
regulation).
136 This simplified version of reality also assumes there are, e.g., no threats
to human health from this standard. The “costs” involved in adverse health events
could be treated as one more factor over which to bargain with producers. See,
e.g., id. at 607-08 (discussing models of the perception of risky food).
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to consumers from the label statement greater than the
corresponding savings in compliance costs, and a more strict
standard would similarly add more to compliance costs than to
increased consumer benefits.137
Suppose then that either a regulator or series of court
decisions established a stricter standard, at one part per
billion.138 A firm viewing this regulation has a series of choices:
(1) remove the label descriptor, (2) maintain the label descriptor
and comply with the new standard, or (3) maintain the label
descriptor, fail to comply with the new quality control standard,
and risk litigation. For a risk-neutral, rational firm, if the
revenue from the label descriptor is less than both the costs of
compliance and the expected value of testing-based lawsuit
settlements, then the firm will find it rational to remove the
label descriptor. If the added revenue from the label descriptor
exceeds that of either compliance or the expected value of
settlement payouts, then the firm will maintain the label.
Assuming the firm keeps the label, whether the firm complies or
risks litigation then depends on the costs of compliance
compared to the expected value of settlement payouts for
noncompliance.139 The total expected value of settlement

137 For example, assume consumers have increasing utility with decreasing
levels of contamination, that is, consumers are happier with lower amounts of
contamination. While these consumers will always be happier with lower levels
of contamination, the marginal costs of quality control are increasing with the
level of quality. That is, it becomes increasingly costly to ensure higher and higher
levels of quality control, due to the need for increasing amounts of monitoring,
more precise and expensive testing, and so on. As with standard supply and
demand models, there will be a point at which the marginal benefit to consumers
from the additional quality will exceed the costs to producers of providing that
level of quality assurance. It would be inefficient for society to push quality
control beyond this level. A more formal framework could, e.g., model consumer
preferences in greater details, but the general reasoning above motivates the
theoretical conclusions in this simplified view of the world. See supra note 3 for
discussion of these applications of the Coase Theorem.
138
See Jha, supra note 134 (providing an overview and theory of
establishing label standards).
139
A risk-neutral firm directly compares the cost of compliance to the
probability of litigation multiplied by the amount it expects to pay to settle the
lawsuits. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation
Financing, 8 J. L. ECON & POL’Y, 593, 597-98 (2012) (discussing risk-neutral
firms in litigation).
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payouts depends on how the firm assesses the probability of
plaintiffs targeting them with testing lawsuits and the expected
payouts that would then occur for meritorious claims.140 If the
firm decided to risk litigation, in a world without transaction
costs settlements would be negotiated costlessly, without
holdouts, and the efficient outcome would be reached. The
producer would compensate consumers the difference between
the one-part-per-billion legal standard and the ten-parts-perbillion efficient standard, all while maintaining quality control
and supply chain monitoring to keep the level of contamination
at ten parts per billion.141
Similarly, if the standard created via court decision or
regulation were higher, say 100 parts per billion, then informed
consumers would be willing to compensate the producer for
tighter quality control standards, up until the costs of providing
a higher quality product exceeded consumers’ willingness to pay
for it.142 Again, the Coase Theorem suggests that without
transaction costs the parties will ultimately settle on the
societally optimal level.143 The power of this theory is to suggest
140 In a fuller sense, the firm would then discount these to the appropriate
time periods based on when they expected settlements to occur, and then compare
that value to discounted expected revenues from the label claims. For an
introduction to discounting, see Vincent M. Jolivet, “Present Value of Future
Earnings” Revisited, 49 INS. COUNSEL J. 316, 316 (1982).
141 The producer’s profits increase by saving costs through looser quality
control standards as it relaxes its procedures. It passes some of the savings on to
consumers to compensate them for violating the rule. Per the assumptions of the
exercise and the fundamental reasoning behind the Coase Theorem, at the socially
efficient level of ten parts per billion the costs to compensate consumers begins
to exceed the savings, and so the efficient equilibrium level is reached. See supra
note 133 for history and discussion of the principles of the Coase Theorem.
142
The consumers extend additional compensation to the company to
tighten quality control standards up until the benefit from the tightened quality
control exceeds the amount the company charges for improving its standards.
Again, per the assumptions behind this exercise, the Coase Theorem suggests the
costs to producers will begin to exceed the amount consumers are willing to pay
for enhanced quality at the socially efficient level. See id.
143
In this simplified analysis, we assume there is no “anti-commons”
situation in which, e.g., multiple plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ attorneys attempt to
maximize welfare vis-à-vis each other with complementary rights, as well as
versus their respective defendants. Such a situation implies inherent
inefficiencies. Ivan Major, Ronald F. King & Cosmin Gabriel Marian,
Anticommons, the Coase Theorem and the Problem of Bundling Inefficiency, 10
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that this efficient outcome would be reached regardless of
whether the rule was one part per billion or 100 parts per billion.
In either case, the parties would negotiate costlessly to the
efficient solution of ten parts per billion in the shadow of the
legal rule. The difference in outcome is not the ultimate level of
contamination in the product, but whether producers
compensate consumers or consumers compensate producers to
reach the socially efficient level. In other words, the established
level of legal contamination—the height of the “fence” between
actionable and non-actionable contamination—fails to matter to
the level of contamination in the product after negotiation
between consumers and producers.144
While this clearly describes an unrealistic setting, relaxing
the assumptions of this model to more closely match the real
world is useful. First, if we allow transaction costs in litigation,
the particular standard (one, ten, or 100 parts per billion) ceases
to be irrelevant. The process of settlement becomes costly, due
to legal fees, discovery costs, and the price of paying attorneys to
negotiate. For each defendant, the possibility of being sued by
many plaintiffs adds hold-out costs to settlements—defendants
in litigation often wish for universal peace, and plaintiffs
knowing this have incentive to delay settlement beyond others,
increasing the value of their individual claim.145 With costly
INT’L J. COMMONS 244, 262 (2016) (“As long as there are multiple owners of
complementary rights, maximizing against each other as well as against the actor
who wishes to purchase a portion of that right, outcomes systematically will be
inefficient.”).
144
Importantly, in this simplified world the same result would apply
regardless of the process of creating the rule. Without transaction costs, that is, in
a model in which litigation and coordination among parties are costless, plaintiffs
and defendants would reach efficient outcomes whether the standard were created
through court decision or regulation. The process of rule creation would be
irrelevant to social efficiency, as the rule itself would not impede costless
bargaining to efficient outcomes. See Lingwall, supra note 11, at 168 (discussing
how parties will reach optimal outcomes regardless of the particular legal rule in
a world of costless bargaining).
145
See, e.g., D. Bruce Johnsen, A Transaction Cost Assessment of SEC
Regulation Best Interest, 18 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 695, 701 (2018) (“Transaction
costs are never zero, and, in any event, they increase with the number, size, and
complexity of transactions, eventually overwhelming the benefits from
negotiating further adjustments.”).

39

124

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 40.2

litigation and coordination, the socially optimal level is not
guaranteed to be reached if the standard is not set at the
efficient level at the beginning. If the standard is established at
less than ten parts per billion, the added costs of finding and
negotiating with consumers, whether through attorneys in the
context of litigation or directly through consumer outreach, will
add to the producer’s quality control costs, so that the point at
which costs match and then begin to exceed consumers’
willingness to pay for extra quality control will remain below the
socially optimal level. Similarly, if the standard established
were greater than ten parts per billion, the costs to consumers
in coordinating responses to the producer’s practice, engaging
the producer through litigation, and so on, lower the net benefit
to consumers from the label statements. Consumers’ willingness
to pay for extra quality control will be lower because of these
costs, and the ultimate level of contamination will exceed the
efficient level. With transaction costs, the level of legally
acceptable contamination or “height of the fence” matters not
just to establishing winners and losers (whether producers pay
consumers to reach the efficient level, or vice versa), but also to
the overall efficiency of the market. The frictions inherent in
exchange mean that a rule established at other than the socially
optimal level will give less than optimal results. In sum, in a
world with transaction costs, the rule will matter.146
In this relaxed model, creating an efficient legal rule
creates value, as parties facing a different rule are unlikely to
bargain in the shadow of the rule to the efficient level. This begs
two related questions. First, what will be the cost of creating the
rule, and second, regardless of cost, which rulemaking process is
most likely to lead to socially optimal rules.147 If the cost of

146 See, e.g., Lingwall, supra note 11, at 169-172. Here, we use the term
“rule” colloquially as an established legal principle, not necessarily the result of
notice and comment regulatory rulemaking.
147 At a theoretical level, this is also an argument for the regulator itself. See
D. Bruce Johnsen, A Coasean Approach to Cost-Benefit Analysis, 42 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 489, 494 (2018) (arguing that regulators should simply ask whether
a proposed regulation lowers transaction costs, and if not, then “the regulation
should be scrapped absent convincing evidence that its benefits exceed its costs”).
In the situation of many-on-many litigation over regulatory versus quasiregulatory standards, coordinating standards-creation in mass actions is likely an
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creating an efficient rule exceeds the societal benefit from the
rule itself, then the rule creation process has thrown the baby
out with the regulatory bathwater.148 If the cost of creating an
efficient rule is minor compared to the societal benefit from the
rule, that is, if rule optimization is more important than the
transaction costs involved in its creation, then choosing a
rulemaking entity or procedure that will achieve, near as
possible, the efficient rule becomes crucial. In the consumer
goods setting considered here, the billions of potential products
sold to millions of consumers mean that due to scale,
inefficiencies in the rule likely outweigh the transaction costs
inherent in the rule creation process, and so the fundamental
question is which rulemaking body is most likely to create a rule
that approaches a societally efficient level.
As discussed above, traditional modeling of this question
would consider at least two options: courts or agencies. 149 While
parties will favor either courts or agencies as decision makers
based on over whom they expect to levy the most comparatively
effective influence, each of these options comes with a complex
slate of costs and benefits. For example, agencies are subject to
capture,150 the electorate may be driven by factors other than the
regulatory issues at hand, such as the social positions of
candidates, only highly sophisticated parties may be able to
substantially influence rulemaking, and so on. 151 At the same
time, agency decision making allows the possibility of
area in which “transaction costs [are] so high that market transactions between the
affected parties are precluded.” Id. at 495.
148
Cf. Fennell, supra note 133, at 1474 n.11 and accompanying text
(discussing when a focus on reducing transaction costs entails such costs that they
“swamp the gain from the newly enabled trades.”).
149 Third-party certification, pressure from trade groups, and other non-legal
options could also be considered, but as primary jurisdiction is the main focus of
the Article we limit this analysis to the creation of enforceable legal standards
rather than those rules that rely on market forces alone. Third party certification
of compliance with a label claim could be valuable, but third party certifications
come with a host of other substantial problems. See, for example, the problems
with “greenwashing” labels to convey to consumers a message of sustainability.
See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing,
43 J. BUS. ETHICS 253, 255 (2003).
150 See Shleifer, supra note 4, at 441.
151 See Coglianese, supra note 24, at 951.
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nationwide input from multiple parties, filtered through a
process reflecting, at least partially, the will of voters through
their elected officials’ regulatory stances. Similarly, standardscreation by courts results from litigation, which is driven by
what plaintiffs find worthwhile to sue about, and is unlikely to
give outcomes reflecting nationwide democratic bargaining by
producers and consumers. On the other hand, courts may be able
to resolve disputes much more quickly than a regulatory process
and may reflect more independent judgment than agency
decision making, which is inherently tied to political forces,
despite the science-based mission of agencies.152
Faced with such a barrage of costs and benefits, theorizing
whether courts and agencies may create more socially optimal
rules requires strong assumptions. For example, agency
expertise in a particular subject matter may mean that agencies
are better positioned to weigh the costs and benefits of a
particular rule, and in a model assuming no regulatory capture,
efficiency could dictate tasking the agency with rule creation. On
the other hand, if one assumes that independence is the primary
factor motivating efficient rule creation, then courts less bound
by political forces are the better regulatory body, despite the
extra time that may be needed to develop sufficient subject
matter expertise to create efficient rules.153 The assumptions
required to solve this debate may vary by the particular issue at
hand.154 In our setting, the negative effect of ad-hoc local
152
153

See Winters, supra note 10, at 596.
Cf. Schlag, supra note 12, at 189:
Another of Coase’s arguments . . . is that we do not have (and
almost never have) the information required to make the
analysis work. In order to decide whether to adopt a liability or
a no-liability regime . . . we need to calculate, at the appropriate
level of generality, all external effects . . . on all the relevant
markets . . .. [W]e almost never have that kind of information
available.

(footnotes omitted).
154
The need for strong assumptions to resolve the court versus agency
question is itself an argument for the continued existence of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine, as primary jurisdiction allows a court to assess the relevant
costs and then allow the opportunity for agency action on a case-by-case basis.
The court can weigh the time necessary to educate itself, the potential delay, and

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/3

42

2020

LIMITS OF MEASURMENT

127

litigation on national product markets could weigh in favor of
agency rulemaking over court-based adjudication.
More importantly, and regardless of whether one believes
courts or agencies are generally better adjudicators in the
quality-control setting, the issues involved in selecting
efficiency-enhancing adjudicators set up the more pertinent
problem considered in the next section: technological change has
the capacity to alter the framework of these calculations. In our
product testing setting, the ability for plaintiffs’ attorneys to
easily access sophisticated laboratory testing has altered their
incentives to bring quality-control based litigation, shifting what
was formerly a regulatory matter to the court system. 155 The
existence of testing results drives up pre-class certification
settlement values, which are overwhelmingly distributed as
attorneys’ fees. In addition to inefficiencies created through
patchwork adjudication of similar issues among courts and
defendants, this shifts the potential value created through
efficient quality-control and labeling standards away from
consumers and producers to transaction costs in the form of
attorneys’ fees. Primary jurisdiction stands as one of the few
ways to shift the benefits of quality-control based labeling
standards away from transaction costs and back to the
parties.156
the costs in terms of uniformity if it proceeds. It may conclude that the costs and
benefits lie in favor of potential agency action. E.g., Tran v. Sioux Honey Ass’n
Coop., No. 8:17–cv–110–JLS–JCGx, 2017 WL 5587276 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11,
2017) (analyzing the possibility of a primary jurisdiction referral).
155
Technological-based decreases in costs associated with laboratory
testing increase the potential gains to plaintiffs attorneys from bringing testingbased litigation. The incentivizes moving potential quality control violations to
the court system rather than the regulatory process, which offers a participatory,
rather than litigation-based, way of creating standards. See, e.g., Farina, supra
note 23, at 402 (discussing participation in the rulemaking process).
156 Setting efficient regulatory quality control standards creates social value
by maximizing the sum of (1) consumer welfare from informative labeling minus
(2) the costs in quality control to conform to labeling statements. See supra note
146 and accompanying text. In the absence of an efficient rule, this value is either
lost due to transactions that do not occur or is converted into transaction costs as
parties negotiate towards the efficient outcome. See id. In areas without clear
regulatory standards, enhanced attorneys’ fee awards based on product testing
thus represent conversion of the potential value from efficient standards into
attorney paychecks. The incentives created for attorneys to establish quasi-
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Increased Scientific Resolving Power and Institutional
Evolution

The prior section showed that the choice of policymakers in
a transaction-cost laden world is a significant one, as the choice
of policymakers matters to both the distributional aspects of
legal rights and to their overall efficiency. It also showed that
technological change is central to this debate, as it alters the
incentives for parties to engage the court system rather than
traditional regulatory channels. This section applies this
analysis to the situation of increasing scientific resolving power
in product testing, its effect on institutions, and the relationship
between courts and agencies in particular.
In the setting of our primary example, the amount of
foreign substance in consumer products was historically difficult
to measure,157 although records exist of contamination of some
goods.158 The penalties for food adulteration when it did occur
regulatory standards thus mirrors those encouraging fraud-detection in other
settings. E.g., Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damges and
Attorney’s Fees For Willful Patent Infringment, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291, 315 (2004)
(“[F]rom the standpoint of optimal deterrence, enhanced damages are
appropriate . . . when there is a risk of underdetection or underenforcement.”).
157 In Accum’s lurid 1820 exposé, he suggests detecting “grosser abuses” of
essential oils by, e.g., testing for the presence of alcohol by adding water and
observing color changes, testing for the presence of turpentine by dipping the oil
in to paper, drying and smelling. ACCUM, supra note 50, at 24. He then notes that
“[t]he more subtle artists, however, have contrived other methods of
sophistication, which elude all trials . . .. without any possibility of discovering
the abuse by any of the before-mentioned trials.” Id. at 24–25. As to food, Accum
believed “[t]he ingenuity and perseverance of self-interest is proof against
prohibitions, and contrives to elude the vigilance of the most active government.”
Id. at 42. In the modern world, testing for the presence of food adulteration at
home is daunting, if not impossible. Some testing can be done, but even that
generally requires some knowledge of chemistry. See D.P. Attrey, Detection of
Food Adulterants/Contaminants, in FOOD SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A
PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 129, 139–41 (Rajul Kumar Gupta, Puja Dudeja &
Amarjeet Singh Minhas, eds., 2017).
158
See Demetrios G. Sotirchos, Georgios P. Danezis & Contantinos A.
Georgiou, Introduction, Definitions and Legislation, in FOOD AUTHENTICATION:
MANGAGEMENT, ANALYSIS, & REGULATION 3, 45 (2017) (noting that since
antiquity “traders used to adulterate wine, pepper, and balsam, all commodities of
high added value and price.”) (citing H. RACKHAM, IV PLINY NATURAL HISTORY
IV LIBRI XII-XVI (1960)). See generally P. Dudeja & A. Singh, Food Safety in
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could be severe, such as being forced to consume the adulterated
food until death.159 The capacity for fraud or other adulteration
increased with industrial-level food production, which developed
on pace with other technology in the industrial revolution.160 For
example, consider the industrialization of a common food
product: bread. Industrial-level production of bread began
around 1810 as various inventions and processes lowered the
costs involved in bread production. In Austria, a process was
developed in 1810 to separate bran from wheat as it was
milled.161 This made producing refined flour less costly.162 A few
decades later in 1834, the McCormick reaper made it far quicker
and easier to harvest grain.163 Around the mid-1800s,
commercial gas ovens were put into use, which stopped bakery
reliance on chopped wood. 164 Steel-rollers were invented in
Hungary in 1865, which again lowered the cost of milling wheat,
and in 1868 Fleischmann’s industrialized “compressed yeast”
took away the need for tending sourdough levains and their

Modern Society—Changing Trends of Food Production and Consumption, in
FOOD SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 83, 85
(Rajul Kumar Gupta, Puja Dudeja & Amarjeet Singh Minhas, eds., 2017)
(describing the change from pre-industrialized to post-industrialized food
processing, characterized by lower nutritive value and greater safety hazards). By
“food fraud” we mean both intentional activities done to deceive consumers and
more general contamination regardless of intent. See generally Demetrios G.
Sotirchos, Georgios P. Danezis & Contantinos A. Georgiou, Introduction,
Definitions and Legislation, in FOOD AUTHENTICATION: MANAGEMENT,
ANALYSIS, & REGULATION 3, 4 (2017) (discussing how the food science literature
classifies food fraud).
159 Schieber, supra note 53, at 2 (“Punishment . . . was rigorous and cruel.
In Nuremberg in the 15th century, an adulterator of saffron was burnt over his
own produce, and others were buried alive or their eyes were gouged out. . .. In
some cases offenders were forced to consume their adulterated food until they
died.”).
160
Id. at 3 (“With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, this issue
increased dramatically. . .. For example, flour was added to sausages to enhance
their water binding capacity, colorants were used to improve the overall
appearance of foods, and milk was diluted with water.”).
161 NATHAN MYHRVOLD & FRANCISCO MIGOYA, 1 MODERNIST BREAD 86
(2017).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 87.
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corresponding lengthy rise times.165 In 1928, Otto Rohwedder’s
ingenuity made sliced bread possible.166 Chemical means to
control weeds and pests began to be used around World War II,
and their use multiplied over following decades.167 In the 1960s,
the Chorleywood process was invented, in which bakers could
dramatically speed up bread production “by adding hard fats,
extra yeast and a number of chemicals and then mixing at high
speed.”168 As industrial-level processing emerged through heavy
use of pesticides, industrial-scale processing of ingredients, and
creative use of food science to manipulate ingredients during
production, the capacity for food fraud increased.169
Until 1800 little could be done scientifically to test for the
presence of contamination.170 The only substantial institutional
check on food quality remained the market reputation of food

Id.
Id. at 88.
167 MYHRVOLD & FRANCISCO, supra note 161, at 89. See S.P. Singh, S. Kaur
& D. Singh, Food Toxicology—Past, Present, and the Future (the Indian
Perspective), in FOOD SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A PUBLIC HEALTH
PERSPECTIVE 91, 95 (Rajul Kumar Gupta, Puja Dudeja & Amarjeet Singh Minhas,
eds., 2017) (providing an international perspective and noting the:
165
166

problem of pesticides in food in India is so widespread that
many consider it extremely difficult, if not impossible to
rectify. . .. [D]espite a ban, the toxic pesticides are freely
available in the market, showing a blatant disregard for public
safety. . .. [T]he public response to pesticide misuse is dismal
as no one except a few wishes to come forward and build
pressue on the government to take remedial actions.
168 BBC, Chorleywood: The Bread that Changed Britain (June 7, 2011),
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-13670278.
169
This is not to say bread was free from adulteration before modern
methods. Bread could be “plumped up with chalk” before industrialized
processes. David Edwards, Food Fraud: It’s What’s for Dinner?, SCI. AM. (Aug.
19, 2014), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/food-fraud-it-s-whats-for-dinner/. See Christina Davis, Panera Bread Class Action Challenges
‘Clean’
Food
Marketing,
TOPCLASSACTIONS
(Apr.
3,
2019),
https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/consumerproducts/food/889097-panera-bread-class-action-challenges-clean-foodmarketing/ (discussing a modern allegation).
170 See Atkins, supra note 50, at 100 (“No reliable tests for the adulteration
of foods existed until about 1800.”).
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producers, but as “advances in science made it possible for firms
to adulterate their goods in ways that were not easily perceived
by consumers,” reputation alone was now insufficient.171 In
response, city-level laboratories began to conduct testing in the
mid-1800s, initially providing help to merchants who suspected
supplier problems.172 States did not begin to pass legislation to
regulate “pure food” until the late 1800s, perhaps in response to
technological change which created substitutes for traditional
products, such as oleomargarine for butter.173 In the United
States, the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 created the FDA.
This was followed by its more powerful sister, the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act of 1938. The FDA’s subsequent rulemaking
under these laws represented something of a culmination of
federal adulteration efforts, establishing national-level
standards to police certain aspects of adulteration.174
Summarizing this history from an institutional
perspective, reputation effects were initially the main check on
adulteration as food production systems industrialized.175 As
food science advanced, reputation effects became insufficient
because undetectable fraud could not generate negative
reputation and check producers. This created incentives to
develop testing technology in response. As it became possible to
measure and test for subtle adulteration at the city or state level,
this enabled previously impossible regulatory mechanisms to
police these standards. The new institutional framework was
regulation rather than reputation, built on advancing resolving
Id. at 104.
Id.
173 See Marc T. Law, The Origins of Pure Food Regulation, 63 J. ECON .
HIST. 1103, 1103–1104 (2003) (analyzing historical data on consumption of
adulterated food and state law passage and finding evidence that pure food laws
served an informational purpose by informing consumers what they were, in fact,
purchasing).
174
Schieber, supra note 53, at 5. See Atkins, supra note 50, at 103
(discussing how other countries lagged the United States).
175
See Attrey, supra note 157, at 133–37 (providing an international
perspective with an extensive list of common food adulterants/contaminants and
their health effects including, e.g., pesticide residues, asbestos, antibiotics,
microorganisms, and toxins). In the United States, FDA is joined by other
regulators with authority over food and pesticides, such as the EPA (regulating
pesticides) and the USDA (regulating, e.g., inspection of meat processing
facilities).
171
172
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power in testing. Regulation flowed from this push-pull between
technological change advancing ways to adulterate food and
methods to detect adulteration, with the regulatory issue often
how much adulteration was too much. All food is adulterated at
some level, and so the institutional view was that reasonable
standards could not demand Platonic purity from food products.
In the United States, the FDA eventually adopted an entire slate
of these food quality standards, along with instructions for how
those standards would be evaluated by the agency.176 These
standards were, to some extent, the product of food producer
input and consumer advocacy.177
Current standards for natural contamination are outlined
in the FDA Food Defects Level Handbook.178 For many foods, it
lists common sources of contamination along with acceptable
levels of contamination. For frozen berries, the standard is no
more than an average of four or more insect larvae per 500
grams.179 For cornmeal, no more than an average of one or more
whole insects per fifty grams.180 Contamination is specified for,
e.g., insect parts, parasites, mold, mildew, rodent filth (no more
than two or more rodent hairs per ten grams crushed oregano!),
and so on. If a particular food is not described specifically via
regulation, “FDA’s technical and regulatory experts in filth and
extraneous materials use a variety of criteria, often in
combination, in determining the significance and regulatory
impact of the findings.”181 Contamination by other sources such
as pesticides are given in 40 CFR § 180, “Tolerances and
Exemptions for Pesticide Chemical Residues in Food.” This
contains an enormous list of possible food contaminants, from
acephate182 to ziram.183
176
See, e.g., FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FOOD LABELING GUIDE
(2013) (providing guidance on FDA food labeling policy).
177 For example, food industry lobbyists were concerned with the burden of
varied state regulations. See DONNA J. WOOD, STRATEGIC USES OF PUBLIC
POLICY: BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 144 (1986).
178 FDA, FOOD DEFECT LEVELS HANDBOOK (2018).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 An insecticide tolerated in, e.g., milk at 0.10 ppm. 40 CFR § 180.108.
183
A fungicide tolerated in, e.g., almonds, up to 0.10 ppm. 40 CFR
§ 180.116.
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With standards for many types of adulteration in place at
the national level, and with threat of regulatory enforcement for
violation, food producers had incentive to establish quality
control standards that would generally ensure products within
regulatory specifications. This did not stop consumer
preferences moving towards demand for clarity about food
production.184 For example, pesticide residue was tolerable
within existing regulations, but consumers with evolving tastes
began to push for something more. 185 In 1990, organic labeling
standards were established to provide additional bright lines for
producers and consumers, taking the place of scattered
marketing and state regulation.186 Even then, demand for higher
quality, or in some sense, simpler food persisted.187 Organic
standards allowed a host of somewhat unnatural substances in
food, and producers saw the ability to signal wholesomeness and
simplicity without the need to qualify as organic. The result was
a host of labeling terms such as “natural,” “real,” and “simple,”
each attempting to convey the idea of sidestepping the
industrialized food chain and avoiding artificial substances.
New label claims outside FDA regulations were blood in
the water to plaintiff attorneys. Litigation over these claims
flourished, hitting the “sweet spot” of labeling that seemed to
convey material facts about the food yet were not subject to
preemption defenses. These litigations centered around what
reasonable consumers might make of label claims, and
enterprising attorneys began to take advantage of relatively
184 See generally Sotirchos, Danezis & Georgiou, supra note 158 (“In recent
days, especially in more economically developed countries . . . consumers have
demanded to know without any doubt the origin and content of the food and
whether it is safe to eat; in certain cases, consumers are willing to pay more for
specific quality attributes.”) (citing Cuputo M. Aprile & R.M. Nayga, Jr.,
Consumers’ Valuation of Food Quality Labels: The Case of the European
Geographic Indication and Organic Farming Labels, 36 INT’L J. CONSUMER
STUDIES 158 (2012)).
185
See Ariele Lessing, A Supplemental Labeling Regime for Organic
Products: How the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Hampers a Market Solution to
an Organic Transparency Problem, 18 MO. ENVT’L. L. & POL’Y REV. 415, 415–
31 (2011) (discussing the history of organic regulation).
186 Id.
187
See, e.g., MICHAEL POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD: AN EATER’S
MANIFESTO (2009) (developing, for example, his famous saying “Eat food. Not
too much. Mostly plants.”).
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costless ways to drive up settlement values: come to the
litigation armed with independent testing results which showed
potential violation of label claims. What would have been a
message from a regulator was now the subject of a complaint:
technological advances in the ability to measure for incredibly
subtle adulteration challenged the existing institutional
framework. In the absence of regulation for these new terms,
reputational effects had again become a central institutional
check on producers—in substance consumers relying on trusted
“natural” brands, and so on, but were now becoming subject to
measurement, and hence litigation.188
Institutionally, as the gap between what was permissible
via regulation and what consumers began to expect from food
widened, plaintiff attorneys began to act as an informal
regulatory body, sending products to laboratories for testing and
using litigation, rather than regulation, as a policing
mechanism.189 In the agency-based regulatory process,

188 In a sense, plaintiff attorneys utilizing testing results in pleadings were
exposing a potential lemons problem created by this new wave of food labeling.
Producers knew much more about the contents of food, including the remnants
from pesticide use and production aids, that under existing regulations need not
be listed as ingredients or disclosed on labels. Modern consumers, just as those in
the 1800’s confronting industrial-level food fraud for the first time, could not
reasonably be expected to possess this level of information. The resulting
informational asymmetries between buyer and seller gave incentive for sellers to
pass off lower-quality products as higher quality or at least keep silent about lowlevel adulteration in “natural” or similarly-labeled foods. Unlike a market for
lemons in cars, however, before the advent of litigation-based product testing that
revealed the possibility of contamination, most consumers would remain unaware
and continue to rely on reputational effects to trust the quality of the item.
189
We use the term “quasi-regulatory” in the sense of (1) pushing a
traditional regulatory agenda, with (2) traditional regulatory mechanisms such as
statistical testing, that (3) imposes traditional regulatory burdens such as quality
control standards, that (4) are established through litigation. The food quality
literature assumes that product testing is embedded in a regulatory framework, not
in plaintiff-pushed patchworks. See Sotirchos et al., supra note 158, at 3:

The proper description of food . . . and its ingredients is
enforced by labeling regulation which aims to reassure the
consumer by giving them all the available information needed
by issuing guidelines . . .. In order to enforce this legislation,
state inspection bodies use various scientific methods to certify
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producers would have the ability to weigh in on proposed rules
through lobbying and participation in notice and comment
rulemaking.190 Absent these processes, producers facing the
burdens of quasi-regulatory, litigation-enforced quality control
without the corresponding benefits of the regulatory process
have responded by trying to reshape the litigation towards
regulation. In this way, the rational response to plaintiff
attorneys stepping into the shoes of regulators is to move the
court to treat the litigation like regulation, moving decision
making back to regulatory bodies. The primary vehicle to shift
adjudication back to the jurisdiction of the regulators is thus
aptly named: primary jurisdiction.191
The two main justifications for primary jurisdiction:
expertise, justifying specific primary jurisdiction in our
terminology, or uniformity, justifying general primary
jurisdiction, flow naturally from this reasoning.192 The
possibility of engaging regulatory agencies staffed by subjectmatter experts through an application of specific primary
jurisdiction may be attractive to defendants concerned with
that the food products . . . fully comply with the label
description.
(emphasis added).
190 The tendency to view courts as a kind of uber-decision maker is not the
province of administrative law alone. It extends to constitutional analysis broadly.
See Leah Litman, The Guns Case is About Much More than Guns, THE ATLANTIC
(Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12/new-yorkstate-rifle-pistol-court/602725/ :
In making the argument that their case still be heard, the
plaintiffs reveal a worrisome, implicit belief: The courts are the
only forum for remedying or stopping unconstitutional conduct.
This is not—nor should it be—the case. The political branches
(including state legislatures and state executives) can remedy
unconstitutional conduct as well; they may even be preferable
to courts, given that they are democratically elected and
accountable to the people—something the Constitution values.
191 This is, of course, not the etymology of the term. “Primary” in “primary
jurisdiction” conveys the idea of a regulator being more fundamental or vital to
the resolution of a particular issue. See Babbin, supra note 102, at 1616–17
(discussing the etymology of “primary jurisdiction”).
192 Stanley & Coursey, supra note 119.
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judge or jury misinterpreting or over-weighting the defendant’s
testing results. Similarly, the potential to influence and create
national-level product liability standards may be attractive to
defendants tired of facing repeated lawsuits in one-off class
actions surrounding label standards around the nation. In each
case, applying either specific or primary jurisdiction has the
potential to extend regulatory benefits and safeguards to
defendants.
If primary jurisdiction is restricted to its origins in rate
setting or similar frameworks, this counterbalancing of the
emergence of a quasi-regulatory state cannot occur. This
restriction would limit institutional evolution in response to
technological change, in effect formalizing plaintiff-based
product testing as an essentially regulatory mechanism. Making
permanent this subsidy to the bar would shift the value created
through regulatory standards from consumers towards
transaction costs.

E. Primary Jurisdiction as Transaction Cost
This final subsection examines a potential response to our
argument. The prior subsection argued that in the face of
plaintiff-based product testing, primary jurisdiction serves as an
avenue to stop conversion of regulatory value into transaction
costs. Yet, invoking primary jurisdiction itself is a costly
litigation strategy. Attorneys’ fees are generated litigating
primary jurisdiction motions, courts must give time to analyzing
them, and if granted, litigation may be delayed, itself a form of
transaction cost as parties remain with undecided disputes.
While these are valid concerns, the nature of quality-control
litigation weighs in favor of allowing referrals.
When litigation is delayed for a specific primary
jurisdiction referral, an efficient court is acknowledging that
either the time needed to develop expertise to adjudicate in a
specific field would cause delay in and of itself, or the benefits
from a more efficient agency-created rule outweigh the costs of
delay.193 Whether the delay is awaiting agency action, or for the
193 See California v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 30-2014-00725287-CU-BTCXC (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2015):
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court to develop sufficient mastery of a technical area to
adjudicate, delay results. In other words, delay is a symptom of
complex litigation, not the primary jurisdiction process alone.194
When expertise to adjudicate would require extraordinary effort
by a court to develop, leaving adjudication to those already
versed in the relative expertise by invoking specific primary
jurisdiction may be efficiency-enhancing and delay reducing in
the long run. Even if an agency takes more time to establish
standards, delay in resolving an individual case is likely
outweighed by the probability an agency will consider the issue,
take public input, and reach a more efficient nationwide rule.
As far as primary jurisdiction “shortcuts” Congressional intent
and violates federalism in establishing a dual regulatory
regime,195 a court allowing a specific primary jurisdiction
referral again recognizes that a dual regulatory scheme is
excessively costly in those circumstances.196 The factual issues
[T]his case is about determining what the public and doctors
need to be told about opioids. That determination . . . entails
much more than determining issues of false and misleading
marketing. Underlying every issue here, this case requires this
court to become an expert in the field in which it has no
expertise. It will have to determine which study, trial, etc. is
appropriate and correct as to each issue concerning the use of
opioids, and to what extent.
If the litigation involves a pressing need for human life or health, delay is a more
significant issue, but both courts and agencies can move quickly when these issues
are at stake. Courts could also issue temporary injunctions to halt immediate risk
of harm while then allowing agency action.
194 But see Occidental Chem. Corp. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 810 F.3d
299, 309–10 (5th Cir. 2016) (characterizing primary jurisdiction as causing
“certainty of delay”).
195 See Cunningham, supra note 10, at 44.
196 Additionally, the argument that primary jurisdiction violates principles
of a dual regulatory scheme are difficult to reconcile with Congress creating many
dual-regulatory schemes after primary jurisdiction was established as a legal
doctrine, meaning Congress acted knowing the possibility of primary jurisdiction
based dialogues between courts and agencies existed. For example, the FDCA,
which creates a dual regulatory system for food labeling, was passed in 1938,
years after the primary jurisdiction doctrine had been created and elaborated on
by the Supreme Court. Whether Congress anticipated the doctrine being invoked
in new areas is questionable, but the doctrine had been well established before
much of the modern regulatory state emerged. See generally Gregory Ablavsky,
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in some regulatory areas are more intricate than others—a court
may be an efficient adjudicator of a simple dispute as part of a
dual regulatory scheme but find itself lacking in a complex
one.197 Similarly, an efficient court allowing a general primary
jurisdiction referral does so because the costs involved in nonuniformity exceed the benefits from dual regulation. In the
context of mass actions, which often involve many potentially
injured parties affected by nationwide products or policies, this
is likely the case.
In this context, preserving the primary jurisdiction
doctrine may also be efficiency enhancing generally in the same
manner as class actions versus individual actions. Just as class
actions coordinate and create efficiencies in many-on-one
litigation for small claims, primary jurisdiction may coordinate
and create efficiencies in many-on-many litigation settings for
small claims. For instance, this might occur when multiple class
actions are filed against many defendants, all hinging on a
central factual theme or question.198 Class actions in the context
of small claims offer at least three advantages over traditional
litigation: collective action enables litigation that could not occur
severally due to direct transaction costs, such as the cost of legal

Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE L.J. 1792, 1800 (2018)
(noting that modern conceptions of constitutional federalism are quite different
from its original construction, as establishing a dual-sovereign governance system
which strengthened states against competing claims from, e.g., corporations and
separatists).
197 That is not to say all food labeling disputes are simple, as food labeling
law may often involve statistical issues (such as in a dispute of nutritional claims)
and economic expertise (such as when establishing a price premium to calculate
damages). E.g., In Re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 919, 944-47 (C.D.
Cal. 2015) (discussing hedonic regression and statistical techniques to establish a
price premium in “all natural” litigation).
198 Class actions themselves may be coordinated, such as pre-trial MDLs
formed from multiple state class actions. “Natural” class actions in particular have
been the subject of multiple law review articles. E.g., Sarah Valenzuela, Tracing
the Evolution of Food Fraud Litigation: Adopting an Ascertainability Standard
that is “Natural”, 34 REV. LITIG. 609 (2015); Shea Thompson, Artificially
“Natural”: Class Action Lawsuits Attack Misleading “Natural” Claims in FDA’s
Absence, 47 IND. L. REV. 893 (2014); Nicole E. Negowetti, Defining Natural
Foods: The Search for a Natural Law, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 329 (2013); Nicole
E. Negowetti, A National “Natural” Standard for Food Labeling, 65 ME. L. REV.
581 (2012).
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services versus small harms, the class action device solves
barriers against collective action such as free-riders and the
externalities created by early litigants exhausting defendants’
resources, and class actions generate positive externalities
outside the litigation itself.199
Through a primary jurisdiction referral, the agency-based
regulatory process becomes a similar way for multiple
stakeholders on both sides of the v. to combine input on a dispute
“mediated” by the agency through a regulatory, non-litigation
process. This enables collective national action which has not
occurred due to the transaction costs involved in many-on-many
decision-making, particularly between state-level actors, and
generates positive externalities in areas beyond the series of
litigations at hand. For example, should the FDA engage
rulemaking surrounding the term “natural” as to trace pesticide
contamination, the hundreds of parties in uncoordinated
litigation over the term would have a collective forum to weigh
in on the term with binding results as the agency acts,
something that has not occurred through costly, competing court
decisions.
In sum, the benefits of maintaining primary jurisdiction as
a possibility for producers in product testing claims likely
outweigh the costs inherent in its invocation. This holds for both
the transaction-cost analysis behind specific and general
primary jurisdiction and the analysis of the nature of efficiencies
in collective action for small harms.
V.

Conclusion

We began with a quote from Robert Frost’s Mending Wall,
noting that legal realism does not “love a wall” imposed between
courts and agencies. In contrast to many academic models which
assume separation between these bodies, primary jurisdiction
has traditionally been a prominent way for these to interface. In
199
See William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation? A Positive
Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709,
710–11, 725-27 (2006) (identifying “decree effects” and “settlement effects”
which like stare decisis make later litigation more efficient by adding information
on the value of legal claims to the marketplace, “threat effects” as the class action
deters future bad behavior by potential defendants, and “structural effects” of
decreasing the need to rely on public enforcement of existing law).
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this Article, we argue that technological change drives litigation
strategies in ways that justify keeping open this channel for
agency referrals, rather than limiting the doctrine to its origins
in specific settings. In Frost’s poem, the farmer continues by
noting “Before I built a wall I’d ask to know // What I was walling
in or walling out.”200 Limiting the primary jurisdiction doctrine
to its original context risks walling product-testing based claims
out of agencies, preserving the creation of quasi-regulatory,
statistical-based quality control regimes by plaintiffs’ attorneys.
Courts and agency regulators in this context need the ability to
integrate, allowing defendants the potential to move these
actions to a regulatory space designed for national-level
deliberating.
In this statistical quality-control framework, primary
jurisdiction allows courts the crucial flexibility of examining
testing-based cases, weighing the transaction costs—whether in
the court developing expertise or the costs stopping collective
action across jurisdictions—and judging when an agency, rather
than the court, might be a better adjudicator. Invoking specific
primary jurisdiction may let agencies construct more optimal
rules due to prior expertise in technical matters that are often
at issue. Similarly, for product-testing based claims with
inherently multi-state implications, invoking general primary
jurisdiction moves the creation of national-level standards away
from courts to a body designed for that purpose. Both these
prevent plaintiff attorneys from capturing the societal benefits
from regulation by establishing themselves as a quasiregulatory body enforcing label claims through independent
testing. In this way, as scientific resolving power and the scope
of potentially measurable harm continue to evolve, primary
jurisdiction serves as a much-needed mechanism allowing
corresponding evolution in adjudication.

200

FROST, supra note 2 at 34.
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